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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE REMOVAL POWER
Ganesh Sitaraman∗
INTRODUCTION
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions targeted communities of color with expensive and risky subprime
mortgage products. Hundreds of thousands of Black and Hispanic
families were charged more for mortgages than their white counterparts
or steered into expensive subprime loans, even though they qualified for
cheaper prime loans.1 Over time, financial institutions like Countrywide
pushed these “toxic” loans on more and more homeowners and expanded
subprime lending throughout the country.2 When the music finally
stopped in 2008, millions of families lost their jobs and their homes,
and nearly $11 trillion in household wealth was wiped out.3 Over the
next two years, Congress would work to pass financial reform legislation
that was designed to address a variety of risks and dangers in the financial markets.
In 2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren proposed a federal agency
to regulate consumer financial products.4 For years, Warren had criticized predatory “tricks and traps” in mortgages, credit cards, and other
financial products.5 One-off, piecemeal reforms had failed, and
Americans were drowning in debt.6 Increasingly, one bad medical diagnosis or the loss of a job would mean bankruptcy and a family’s total
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law and Director, Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt Law School.
Thanks to Rebecca Allensworth, Kate Andrias, Jed Britton-Purdy, Jessica Clarke, Dan Epps, Joey
Fishkin, Gautam Hans, Amy Kapczynski, Daryl Levinson, Adam Levitin, David Lewis, Leah
Litman, Bill Marshall, Lev Menand, Gillian Metzger, Tim Meyer, David Pozen, Ed Rubin, J.B.
Ruhl, Chris Serkin, Dan Sharfstein, Suzanna Sherry, Reva Siegel, Chris Slobogin, Kevin Stack,
David Strauss, Mike Vandenbergh, Adam Winkler, Ingrid Wuerth, and participants in workshops
at the University of North Carolina Law School and Wharton Legal Studies and Business Ethics
Department for comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Cloe Anderson, Meredith Capps, and
Madeleine Carpenter for helpful research assistance.
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to
Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21,
2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-resolveallegations-lending-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6U2N-7HLY]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in More than $175
Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims (July 12, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more175-million-relief [https://perma.cc/4VEN-7K4E].
2 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 104–05 (2011).
3 Id. at xv.
4 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, no. 5, Summer 2007,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate [https://perma.cc/27NQ-XFXY].
5 See id.
6 See id.
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economic devastation. Warren argued that other consumer products,
like toasters, were regulated at the federal level.7 Financial products
were not so different. By 2009, Congress and the President picked up
Warren’s proposal, and they made it one of the central parts of the coming financial reform package.8
That is when the opposition kicked into gear. For the next decade,
opponents of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) waged
an all-out war against the agency, dumping millions of dollars into efforts to stop the agency from coming into being.9 When they failed to
prevent its creation, they switched gears to slow its functioning. And
when the Trump Administration gained control of the CFPB, it began
to dismantle the agency from the inside.10 As with the Affordable Care
Act, this Obama Administration achievement faced a sustained and relentless assault on its very existence.
A reader of Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,11 however, would have little sense of the bruising, bare-knuckle,
decade-long fight over the agency. Instead, the case presents itself as
posing a relatively straightforward, albeit novel-on-the-facts, separation
of powers question: Is it constitutional for Congress to create an agency
headed by a single director who is insulated from presidential removal,
except in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”?12
A summary is simple: In 2017, the CFPB issued a demand for Seila
Law LLC to produce information on its business practices, as part of
the agency’s investigation of the law firm for violating telemarketing
laws.13 Seila refused, arguing that the CFPB single-director structure
with for-cause removal violated the separation of powers.14 The CFPB
filed suit to enforce its demand.15 Writing for three Justices, with two
others concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with
Seila and found the agency’s design unconstitutional, in the process setting up a framework that appears to allow Congress to condition removal from office for members of multimember commissions but not for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7
8

See id.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/business/economy/01regulate.html [https://
perma.cc/6FUH-MUDE].
9 See infra section I.A, pp. 358–64.
10 See infra section I.C, pp. 371–73.
11 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
12 Id. at 2193 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018)).
13 See id. at 2194 (citing CFPB v. Seila Law, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01081, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017)).
14 Id.
15 Id. By the time the case came to the Supreme Court, the Trump Administration had agreed
with Seila on the merits of the constitutional question, so the Court appointed Paul Clement as
amicus to argue the case for the CFPB’s constitutionality. See id. at 2195.
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single-director agency heads.16 At the same time, the Chief Justice wrote
for seven Justices that the CFPB’s for-cause removal restriction was
severable from the rest of the statute and that it alone would be
struck17 — leaving the agency in place but now with a presidential removal threat looming over its director.
Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with
the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting
language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about
the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation
of powers. She systematically argued that “constitutional text, history,
and precedent invalidate[] the majority’s thesis.”18 Justice Kagan even
accused the majority of “gerrymander[ing]” their “made up” rule to
strike down the CFPB’s independent structure.19 For a separation of
powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.
But why?
Seven Justices agreed that the CFPB can continue to regulate financial products, so long as its head is removable at will by the President.
Seila, the law firm, is likely still subject to the investigatory demand
because the Trump CFPB, now with a removable director, says it has
ratified that demand.20 And Seila, the case, means that if Democratic
nominee Joe Biden wins the White House in November, he can fire the
Republican-appointed head of the CFPB and install a pro-regulatory
appointee. Given that this was one of the marquee cases of the 2019
Term and that the decision broke 5–4 along ideological lines, these are
hardly epochal consequences.
Supreme Court cases are often seen as “political” because the firstorder effects of the decisions have self-evident political, partisan, or
ideological consequences. Bush v. Gore21 chose a President. NFIB v.
Sebelius22 could have overturned a President’s namesake healthcare initiative. This Term’s cases on abortion23 and the President’s taxes24 have
obvious “political” valence. On an initial glance, Seila is different. The
first-order consequences of the decision are not self-evidently political.
The decision does not invalidate the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau as a whole or strip it of any substantive powers. It does not
favor the Trump Administration, as President Trump already has his
handpicked head of the CFPB in place. It does not favor Republican
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16
17
18
19
20

See id. at 2199, 2201.
Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2240 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2225.
See Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,330 (July 10, 2020) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R.).
21 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
22 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
23 See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
24 See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020); see also Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct.
2019 (2020).
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Presidents over Democratic ones in some more systematic way either:
Presidents of either party could fire the head of the CFPB upon taking
office and nominate a new one. Indeed, even if Seila is a step toward
overturning removal conditions altogether — making commissions like
the FTC and FCC less independent — it is not clear that the first-order
effects of that rule are “political” either. Republican and Democratic
Presidents alike might use their unitary executive power of removal to
fire ideologically misaligned commissioners and choose ones more to
their liking.
My aim in this Comment is to offer something of a Rashomon25 of
Seila to try to explain why Seila was so hotly contested, why it is a
marquee case, and why it might be considered a “political” decision —
in spite of the symmetrical first-order effects and limited consequences
for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.26 Throughout this
Comment, I use the word “political” in different ways, in order to explore how a case can be “political” beyond obvious first-order electoral
consequences (as in Bush v. Gore) or policy consequences (as with NFIB
v. Sebelius).
The first story is of how Seila itself came to be. It is not entirely
clear why Seila was brought to the Supreme Court. After the Court’s
2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board,27 it was predictable that the Court would likely hold that the
remedy for an unconstitutional removal provision was simply to strike
it and leave the agency in place. So why bring the case if recovery was
unlikely? Part I provides the policy context for Seila, outlining the origins of the CFPB and the decade-long fight over its existence. This
context shows how the financial industry, political leaders, and others
deployed a variety of tactics and arguments to try to kill or weaken the
consumer agency. Seila must be understood in this context. It did not
simply arise, as the Court suggested, from novel legislative design. It
was the culmination of a relentless antiregulatory oppositional campaign
that began when Congress and the President took up Warren’s
proposal — and that eventually turned into a constitutional battle.
The second story places Seila within the context of the rise of the
unitary executive theory. Part II shows how the unitary theory went
from virtually nonexistent in the 1970s to a major part of legal and
scholarly debate by the 1990s and 2000s. Its rise was not so much a
function of popular constitutionalism in the form of a social movement
or public opinion as it was elite efforts. The unitary executive theory
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25 RASHOMON (Minoru Jingo 1950) (depicting the same event through the perspectives of different characters).
26 This approach aligns with the law and political economy framework, which seeks to center
issues of power, equality, and democracy rather than separating the market from politics. See generally Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond
the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020).
27 561 U.S. 477 (2010). See infra section I.D, pp. 374–75, for a discussion.
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gained steam through the initiative of conservative presidential administrations (Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush) and a systematic effort
to articulate and defend the theory in legal scholarship. Chief Justice
Roberts’s straightforward, briefly reasoned opinion in Seila reflects the
success of the conservative legal movement in making the theory plausible. Justice Kagan’s piercing dissent lays bare how contested this reasoning is. Taken together, the conservative push for a unitary executive
and the battle between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan should
leave readers with the sense that the case is “political” in a different sense.
The third story is one of values and consequences rather than historical context. Given that the first-order consequences of Seila and of a
presidential removal power are symmetrical for presidents of both political parties, are there “political” reasons why conservatives are so interested in the presidential removal power? And conversely, are there
“political” reasons why liberals and progressives have been so opposed
to it? The opinion in Seila leaves traces of possible normative views of
how the separation of powers should be enforced, which in turn point
to some potentially larger ideological stakes. In addition, scholars often
reference the rise of the removal power as a danger to the administrative
state, but it is unclear precisely through what mechanism this operates,
given the first-order symmetry of the rule itself. Part III canvasses these
normative views and the mechanisms that might produce asymmetric
consequences. It is admittedly a speculative enterprise, but to the extent
any of these normative views or policy consequences ring true (and they
may not, or may not for everyone), they further indicate why Seila and
the removal power should be considered deeply “political.”
I. THE ASSAULT ON THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU
In her 2007 article first making the case for a federal agency to regulate consumer financial products, then-Professor Warren described
how financial institutions had engaged in a variety of unfair and predatory practices.28 One-off regulatory solutions had not stopped lender
kickbacks, product steering toward vulnerable communities, or tricks,
traps, and obfuscation in financial agreements.29 Families were suffering as a result. Warren thus argued for the creation of a new agency,
akin to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), that would
regulate mortgages and other financial products just like the CPSC regulates toasters and other consumer goods.30
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28
29
30

See Warren, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
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Warren offered the CPSC as an analogy, but her focus was not on
whether there should be a single-director agency or a multimember commission.31 Rather, at that point, and throughout the fight to create the
CFPB, she primarily wanted an agency that focused on products, rather
than issuers, in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage; that would have a
mission focused solely on consumer financial protection, rather than
having multiple missions; and that would be strong and independent so
it could evade industry capture.32 Importantly, she noted that the ultimate effect of sound regulation would be to improve markets.33 As with
food, drugs, and other consumer products, trust in the safety of the product would make consumers more comfortable and markets more
competitive.34
The proposal immediately met with two reactions. The first was
that it would be effective. A new agency with powers akin to other
regulatory agencies could significantly improve the consumer financial
product market. The other thing Warren was told: “Don’t do it.”35
“There is no possible way you can win,” people in Washington said,
“because this is going to cost some big banks real money.”36 They cautioned her that the biggest banks would “sweep through this town with
their lobbyists, and you will end up with nothing.”37 Instead, they advised her to ask for “bunches of little things, and maybe you will get one
or two things.”38 The warnings did not have their intended effect.
Warren redoubled her efforts and began to mobilize support from as
many groups and individuals as she could.39 The AFL-CIO, the AARP,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Warren later commented that as the idea gained traction and she talked to experts about
agency design, she quickly came to support a single-director structure. Elizabeth Warren, The
Banking Industry’s Transparent Attempt to Weaken the CFPB, HUFFPOST (Oct. 20, 2016, 5:41
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/banking-industrys-attempt-weaken-cfpb_b_8340792 [https://
perma.cc/R6M4-ARXB].
32 Warren, supra note 4. For discussions of how the CFPB fulfilled these aims, see generally
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 15 (2010); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction,
32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543 (2019).
33 See Warren, supra note 4.
34 Id.
35 Kara Swisher & Walt Mossberg, The 30-Year “Sudden Explosion” of Senator Elizabeth
Warren (Video), VOX: RECODE (June 10, 2015, 4:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/
6/10/11563396/the-30-year-sudden-explosion-of-sen-elizabeth-warren-video
[https://perma.cc/L5C3-V3L4].
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See id.
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the NAACP, and others joined her,40 and together, they started to push
for the agency.41
A. The Path to Passage
When the Obama Administration offered its outline for financial reform in 2009,42 financial institutions immediately identified “killing” the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as their “top priority.”43 According to news reports, they vowed to fight the proposal “with everything
they ha[d].”44 In September 2009, the Chamber of Commerce began a
$2 million ad campaign opposing the reforms45 and even created a “Stop
the CFPA” website.46 By March of 2010, with the CFPB having passed
the House of Representatives and negotiations proceeding in the Senate,
the Chamber announced it was “intensifying” its campaign against the
CFPB.47 Its multimillion-dollar television, radio, online, and grassroots
outreach effort had already generated nearly two hundred thousand letters to Congress.48 That year, the financial sector ended up spending
$481.2 million dollars lobbying,49 and it made $346.7 million in campaign contributions in that year’s midterm elections.50 All in all, some
three thousand lobbyists worked to kill or weaken parts of the DoddFrank bill — almost six lobbyists for every member of Congress.51
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40
41

See id.
There are a number of excellent accounts of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act from participants and journalists. ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE (2014) offers Warren’s own
account of her efforts to get the CFPB passed into law. ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS:
HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T (2013) is a journalistic account that uses the Dodd-Frank Act as a lens through which to see how Congress functions.
42 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION
55 (2009).
43 Andrews, supra note 8.
44 Id.; see KAISER, supra note 41, at 127, 131, 134–36 (discussing the banking lobby’s immediate
opposition to the agency).
45 Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2009,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125236911298191113 [https://perma.cc/JT7P-56D2].
46 Earlier in the legislative process, the agency was called the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency, rather than Bureau. I refer to it throughout as Bureau or CFPB for simplicity.
47 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Com., U.S. Chamber Intensifies Campaign for Bipartisan
Financial Regulatory Reform (Mar. 25, 2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/pressrelease/us-chamber-intensifies-campaign-bipartisan-financial-regulatory-reform
[https://perma.cc/7JGR-8XY7].
48 Id.
49 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Lobbying, 2019, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.
opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?ind=F [https://perma.cc/29NH-X3F6].
50 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=F [https://perma.cc/FW92-8UQM] .
51 Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank, THE NATION (Apr. 30, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-wall-street-defanged-dodd-frank
[https://perma.cc/CEQ8-PQJH].
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Opponents of the CFPB recognized the unpopularity of advocating
against consumer protection. After all, the proposal came in the wake
of a historic economic crash that was rooted in practices designed to
steer or trick consumers into expensive and risky financial products. As
a lobbyist for the Financial Services Roundtable admitted in the summer of 2009, “the optics are bad.”52 Financial industry lobbyists and
their allies did not argue that their bottom lines would suffer from regulation. Rather, they offered a variety of substantive arguments against
the agency. These arguments can be grouped into three categories.
First were arguments denying the need for structural changes. Some
opponents argued that weak consumer financial products had little to
do with the crash.53 Regulation of any kind, let alone structural regulation, was therefore disconnected from the causes of the crisis. Others
conceded the need for reforms but suggested instead “beefed-up” powers
for existing regulatory agencies.54 Still others suggested placing a new
office within the FDIC55 or creating a council of existing regulators.56
These arguments allowed opponents of the CFPB to claim the high
ground in supporting regulation, while effectively minimizing change
and keeping the existing (and flawed) structures in place.
The second category included technocratic consequentialist arguments. Arguments of this type were not actually a case against a new
agency. They were a case against hypothetical regulations that might
emerge from a new agency. Opponents of the new agency thus argued
that it might harm small businesses57 and increase the costs of loans and
other financial products.58 At one point in spring of 2010, they even
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52
53

See Andrews, supra note 8.
The Editors, The Case Against the Dodd Bill, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/04/case-against-dodd-bill-editors [https://perma.cc/E8CY54FM]; Duncan Currie, Getting Financial Reform Right, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 25, 2010, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/03/getting-financial-reform-right-duncan-currie
[https://perma.cc/VY58-PK89] (“I don’t see consumer protection as being at all part of the problem
we are trying to fix.” (quoting John Cochrane)).
54 R. Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: Summers Urges Speed on Bank Reforms, Says Consumer Protection Agency Essential, 93 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 506 (Sept. 22, 2009) (“[T]he
Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, and 23 other business groups
said creating a stand-alone consumer protection agency with broad powers ‘is not the correct approach.’ Instead . . . existing regulatory agencies could be given beefed-up powers.”).
55 See Victoria McGrane, Consumer Agency Fight Continues, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2010, 3:20
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/03/consumer-agency-fight-continues-033706 [https://
perma.cc/E4FA-Z9L4 ].
56 See U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47.
57 U.S. Chamber of Com., The Proposed CFPA Will Disproportionately Harm Small Businesses,
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/chambers/files/
proposedcfpawilldisproportionatelyharmsmallbusinesses.pdf [https://perma.cc/J98C-85D2].
58 James Gattuso, Senator Dodd’s Regulation Plan: Fourteen Fatal Flaws, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/report/senator-dodds-regulationplan-14-fatal-flaws [https://perma.cc/TK7L-8DDW].
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alleged that the CFPB would regulate orthodontists who offer payment
plans for parents whose kids need braces.59 Still others claimed the proposal would create “a fragmented system of regulation,” even though it
was designed to do the opposite.60 This mix of tradeoffs, misdirection,
and fearmongering was common throughout 2009 and 2010, and it appeared to be designed at a minimum to shrink the scope of the CFPB’s
authority — and at a maximum to sow the seeds of doubt among fencesitters about the need for a new agency with a broad mandate.
The third category included structural consequentialist arguments.61
These usually came in two flavors, both with hefty libertarian impulses.
The first was that a new agency would be a “paternalistic,” “elitist,”
“financial nanny” that undermined freedom and individual liberty.62
The agency, these terrified opponents claimed, would “for the first time”
ever in the history of the country prevent people from buying products
and services that are not inherently dangerous.63 This was, of course,
manifestly incorrect, as federal regulation has long restricted the sale of
many kinds of products that are not inherently dangerous. The point,
however, seems to have been to activate libertarian impulses toward individual freedom.
The second flavor were arguments that framed the agency as a tyrannical, authoritarian apparatus that had “unchecked powers and massive authority over the economy.”64 Senator Mike Enzi, for example,
said that the agency would become the “single most powerful agency in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
59 Chris Frates, Banks Will Accept Consumer Agency, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2010, 6:26 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/04/banks-will-accept-consumer-agency-035948
[https://perma.cc/LT5S-F3K9]; Chris Frates, GOP Chips Away at Wall St. Bill, POLITICO (May 9,
2010, 6:42 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/05/gop-chips-away-at-wall-st-bill-036983
[https://perma.cc/74SG-FXQH].
60 U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47.
61 On the difference between technocratic and structural thinking and reform generally, see, for
example, GANESH SITARAMAN, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY 51–52 (2019); GANESH
SITARAMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNBUNDLING “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 10–11 (2014),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/TooBigToFail-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7TX-S5TS].
62 See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency, AM. ENTER. INST.
(July 14, 2009), https://www.aei.org/articles/the-consumer-financial-protection-agency [https://
perma.cc/6Q7R-22V7]; Peter J. Wallison, Elitist Protection Consumers Don’t Need, AM. ENTER.
INST. (July 13, 2009), https://www.aei.org/articles/elitist-protection-consumers-dont-need
[https://perma.cc/JKW4-GRDM]; Anthony Dick, Re: Financial Nanny, NAT’L REV. (July 8, 2009,
3:54 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/re-financial-nanny-anthony-dick [https://
perma.cc/Y8VG-YB94].
63 Wallison, Elitist Protection Consumers Don’t Need, supra note 62.
64 U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47. Language of this type is an example of what Professor
Gillian Metzger has called “rhetorical anti-administrativism.” Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme
Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34–38 (2017).
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the Federal Government” and would exercise “unchecked power.”65
Claims of “unchecked power” were also manifestly incorrect. At a minimum, the proposed CFPB would have been subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act’s requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review.66 The idea that the agency would somehow be the most
powerful agency in the federal government was also far-fetched, to say
the least. Competitors might include the Justice Department, which can
prosecute and incarcerate; the Federal Reserve, which can crash the
economy in setting monetary policy; and the Federal Trade Commission,
whose powers include regulating “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce”67 — a power much broader than the CFPB’s
authority to address unfair and abusive practices related to a “consumer
financial product or service.”68 The value of these arguments seems not
to have been precision in the possible harms but the crafting of a libertarian, road-to-serfdom narrative of the slippery slope of governmental
power. This narrative, like the broccoli argument in the adjacent health
care debate,69 would ultimately migrate from public debate into the legal
arena and take on a constitutional valence.
Importantly, so far as I can tell, at no time in the legislative debates
did a member of Congress argue that the CFPB’s design was unconstitutional. Searching the House and Senate debates for references to the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the CFPB turns up not a single reference.70 The debate over the agency — even with heated rhetoric
that trended toward absurdity — was fundamentally political, economic, and ideological, not constitutional.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65 Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 888 n.23 (2012).
66 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ariel Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and
Multimember Commissions, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 728, 739–40 (2019) (explaining that baseline
procedural checks apply to both single-director agencies and multimember commissions).
67 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
68 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1031, 1036 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.).
69 The individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
led critics to ask if there was anything to prevent the government from requiring that people purchase broccoli. For an explanation of the role of broccoli in the debate of the ACA, see Mark D.
Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 69 (2013); and NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
558, 608 (2012) (both Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent
address the broccoli hypothetical).
70 To determine whether there had been a discussion of constitutionality, Vanderbilt research
librarian Meredith Capps undertook two searches. First: she looked at all the briefs in the case, in
search of any reference to legislative history that would indicate a concern with constitutionality.
Second: she searched the compiled legislative history record for the Dodd-Frank Act in ProQuest
Legislative Insight for any reference to “unconstitutional,” “constitutional,” “separation of powers,”
“humphrey’s,” “morrison,” “myers,” and “free enterprise fund.” In both cases she found no indication
that there were constitutional concerns with the agency. I thank her greatly for her diligent work.
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With these arguments in place, the debate was polarized from the
start. Representative Barney Frank led the House effort to create the
CFPB, and he supported a single-director agency from the beginning.71
But he initially lacked the votes for that design, so he adopted a commission structure.72 Every Republican on the Energy and Commerce
Committee voted against the agency in committee and every Republican
in the House of Representatives voted against the overall bill in the fall
of 2009.73 One conservative commentator said that when it came to the
House bill, “[t]he bad can be summed up in four words: Consumer
Financial Protection Agency.”74
The Senate took up the bill in the spring of 2010.75 “[T]he fighting
was intense,” said former (and later) law professor Michael Barr, who
was then heading up financial reform at the Treasury Department.76
There were fears that the publicly popular CFPB would not get a vote
in the Senate because senators did not want to vote for it and anger the
banks or vote against it and anger their constituents. Warren pushed
hard for a clean, public vote on the agency,77 and she announced her
intention to fight efforts to water down the agency into a fig leaf reform
without serious authority. “My first choice is a strong consumer agency,”
she said at the time.78 “My second choice is no agency at all and plenty
of blood and teeth left on the floor.”79 And, she noted, “My 99th choice
is some mouthful of mush that doesn’t get the job done.”80 Aware of the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 Letter from Barney Frank, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, to Kyrsten Sinema, Rep.,
U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 16, 2015), available at https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=00000150-81e6-ddfb-a3f0-97fe287c0000 [https://perma.cc/LJF2-Y8QL].
72 H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 112 (2009); Letter from Barney Frank, supra note 71.
73 See Office of the Clerk, Roll Call 968 | Bill Number: H.R. 4173, U.S. House of Representatives
(Dec. 11, 2009), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2009968 [https://perma.cc/R9E6-UMNR]; H.R. REP.
NO. 111-367, at 93 (2009), https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt367/CRPT-111hrpt367-pt1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XD9T-G4UU]; see also Duncan Currie, Fed-Bashing and Consumer Protection,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 5, 2010, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/03/fed-bashing-andconsumer-protection-duncan-currie [https://perma.cc/R23U-PEWP].
74 Stephen Spruiell, House Passes Financial Reform Bill, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 11, 2009, 9:00 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/house-passes-financial-reform-bill-stephen-spruiell
[https://perma.cc/742W-XVJY].
75 See David M. Herszenhorn & Edward Wyatt, Republicans Allow Debate on Financial
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2010), https://nyti.ms/332wBNk [https://perma.cc/6TUY-YMPG].
76 Rivlin, supra note 51.
77 WARREN, supra note 41, at 155–59.
78 Shahien Nasiripour, Fight for the CFPA Is “A Dispute Between Families and Banks,” Says
Elizabeth Warren, HUFFPOST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fight-for-the-cfpais-a-d_n_483707 [https://perma.cc/M9B6-U8HT].
79 Id.
80 Id.
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two sides behind the legislative negotiations, Rolling Stone framed the
fight as “Elizabeth Warren vs. Wall Street.”81
Republicans in the Senate used all three arguments against the
CFPB in combination, and they emphasized new ones as well. Senator
Bob Corker, for example, worried that consumer protection would not
be coordinated with financial stability and proposed creating a veto for
CFPB rules.82 The American Bankers Association supported this position as a way to weaken the agency, even though it had opposed linking
consumer protection and financial stability a mere four years earlier.83
Back then, decoupling these functions had been proposed to strengthen
consumer protection.84 Warren called out this hypocrisy as proof that
the banks’ only consistent principle was opposition to regulation.85
Navigating these political waters, Senator Chris Dodd, who was
leading financial reform efforts in the Senate, adopted a variation on
Corker’s proposal.86 The final Dodd bill involved a single-director
agency located within the Federal Reserve, and it gave the Financial
Stability Oversight Council a limited veto over some of the CFPB’s regulations, making the CFPB the only agency with such a check.87 Some
liberals worried the Dodd bill was too weak because of the inclusion of
the veto provision.88 But even with the accommodation to Senator
Corker, the CFPB’s creation remained “the most contentious issue” in
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81 Tim Dickinson, Elizabeth Warren vs. Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 12, 2010, 2:43 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/elizabeth-warren-vs-wall-street-194416
[https://perma.cc/3BWK-QH5N].
82 Currie, supra note 53.
83 See Elizabeth Warren, Banking on Hypocrisy, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2010, 5:05 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/03/banking-on-hypocrisy-035163
[https://perma.cc/M8W8BB3T].
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 For a discussion of the Corker-Dodd negotiations and their failure, see KAISER, supra note
41, at 250–56.
87 S. 3217, 111th Cong. §§ 113(a)(1), 1011(a)–(b) (2010); see also JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R45052, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (FSOC): STRUCTURE
AND ACTIVITIES 3 (2018) (explaining that because Section 113(a)(1) requires an affirmative vote
from the Secretary to designate a nonbank as posing systemic risk, the FSOC chair has an effective
veto); Mike Konczal, The GOP Doesn’t Oppose Richard Cordray. It Opposes His Whole Agency.,
WASH. POST (May 25, 2013, 2:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/
05/25/the-gop-doesnt-oppose-richard-cordray-it-opposes-his-whole-agency [https://perma.cc/XFS7DLEQ] (noting the veto power is “a feature that does not apply to any other regulator”).
88 See, e.g., Pat Garofalo, Corker: I Wish Dodd Would Negotiate with Me, so I Could Weaken
His Consumer Protection Bureau, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 1, 2010, 10:00 PM),
https://shorturl.at/oqBET [https://perma.cc/Z9MG-8WRA].
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the debate.89 According to Corker, the agency’s inclusion prevented any
Republicans from agreeing to financial reform.90
With the CFPB in the Dodd bill, Republicans proposed an amendment on the Senate floor — now to reduce the agency’s powers and
place it within the FDIC.91 Warren observed that the “lobbyists’ closest
friends in the Senate would like nothing better than passing an agency
that has a good name but no real impact so they have something good
to say to the voters — and something even better to say to the lobbyists.”92 Nonetheless, the consumer agency wouldn’t die.93 The last-ditch
efforts to kill it failed. With Dodd’s bill having the votes to pass in the
Senate, Frank immediately agreed to a single-director structure in conference committee, as it had always been his preference.94 President
Obama signed the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau into law
on July 21, 2010.95
B. Halftime
“Halftime.” That’s what the head lobbyist for the Financial Services
Roundtable called it when the Dodd-Frank Act passed.96 The financial
industry and Republicans understood that even though they had lost the
first legislative battle, the war over financial regulation would continue
in Congress, in the agencies, and ultimately, in the courts.
1. Money and Influence. — Financial institutions ramped up their
lobbying efforts and campaign spending. In 2012, the financial industry
spent $749 million on campaign contributions, shifting from a roughly
even split funding both parties in prior cycles to spending almost seventy
percent of their contributions on Republicans.97 That was on top of $490
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 James Rowley & Lisa Lerer, Consumer Agency Still “Elephant” in Room in Debate,
BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2010, 3:42 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-03/
consumer-protection-still-elephant-in-room-for-financal-overhaul-debate [https://perma.cc/P3AM8PVN].
90 Id. (describing Senator Corker’s view that the CFPB’s creation was “the elephant in the room”
that prevented any bipartisan agreement on Dodd-Frank).
91 Wilmarth, supra note 65.
92 Nasiripour, supra note 78.
93 Elizabeth Warren, Consumer Agency that Won’t Die, POLITICO (June 1, 2010, 4:58 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/06/consumer-agency-that-wont-die-037971
[https://perma.cc/FH9J-ARWS].
94 Letter from Barney Frank, supra note 71.
95 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1396, 1964 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.); see also Ross Colvin, Obama Signs Sweeping Wall Street Overhaul into Law, REUTERS (July
21, 2010, 9:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-obama/obama-signssweeping-wall-street-overhaul-into-law-idUSTRE66K1QR20100722 [https://perma.cc/RCD7-DU7G].
96 Rivlin, supra note 51.
97 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2020&ind=F
[https://perma.cc/9WA9TXWK].
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million in lobbying expenses.98 To get a sense of the size and scope of
the lobbying effort, consider this: in 2012, the top five consumer advocacy groups had twenty lobbyists in Washington. The top five financial
industry groups had 406 — just about one per member of Congress.99
And those numbers undercount the extensive additional resources that
financial industry lobbyists had at their disposal in the form of researchers, PR consultants, and regulatory lawyers.100 By the 2015–2016 cycle,
the sector was spending more than $2 billion between contributions and
lobbying — amounting to $2.7 million a day.101
The consequences of these resource imbalances were real. Consumer
groups had 116 meetings with regulatory agencies in the years after
Dodd-Frank was passed; the top five commercial banks met with them
901 times.102 A study that looked into the relationship between money
and policy found that members of Congress who voted for rolling back
financial reforms got two to four times as much in campaign contributions from Wall Street PACs than did those who held the line and protected reform.103 At the time, Dennis Kelleher, the head of the financial
reform group Better Markets, asked, “How do you compete when one
side is this hydra-headed monster that can devote unlimited resources
to killing, gutting or otherwise weakening financial reform?”104
The fight against the CFPB continued in public as well. In 2015,
the heads of six big trade associations — the American Bankers
Association, American Land Title Association, Consumer Bankers
Association, Credit Union National Association, Independent Community
Bankers Association, and National Association of Federal Credit
Unions — penned a joint op-ed again calling for restructuring the
agency.105 A $500,000 television ad campaign, funded by a group whose
board included lobbyists for the student loan giant Naviant (which was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
98 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Lobbying, 2019, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.
opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2020&ind=F [https://perma.cc/T9K5-DRX5].
99 Rivlin, supra note 51.
100 Id.
101 AFR Report: Wall Street Lobby and Campaign Cash Tops $2 Billion for 2016 Elections, AMS.
FOR FIN. REFORM (Mar. 8, 2017), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2017/03/afr-report-wall-streetlobby-campaign-cash-tops-2-billion-2016-elections [https://perma.cc/5R5P-7TEY].
102 Rivlin, supra note 51.
103 See Daniel Stevens, Representatives Voting for Dodd-Frank Rollback Receive Millions from
Top Wall Street Banks, MAPLIGHT (Dec. 12, 2014), https://maplight.org/story/representativesvoting-for-dodd-frank-rollback-receive-millions-from-top-wall-street-banks
[https://perma.cc/7R77-ZX5C].
104 Rivlin, supra note 51.
105 Frank Keating, Michelle L. Korsmo, Richard Hunt, Jim Nussle, Camden R. Fine & B. Dan
Berger, CFPB Should Be Bipartisan Commission, THE HILL (Sept. 30, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-administration/255322-cfpb-should-be-bipartisancommission [https://perma.cc/6EP7-WJED].

366

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:352

sued by the CFPB), framed the agency as something from the authoritarian Soviet Union.106 In the ad, bureaucratic drones deny loan applications in a massive room, with giant red banners featuring the faces of
by-then Senator Warren and then-Director Richard Cordray hanging in
the background.107 In the eyes of opponents, the Director was a “politically biased regulatory dictator” (that was an industry op-ed in the Wall
Street Journal).108 The agency’s textbook rulemaking powers amounted
to “mak[ing] up laws as it goes along” and were “counter to the American
system of limited government” (that was a commentator at the Heritage
Foundation).109 The Republican Party platform in 2016 even declared
that the CFPB was a “rogue agency” with “dictatorial powers.”110
Importantly, framing the fight as restructuring to prevent a “dictatorial”
agency enabled opponents to avoid attacking the agency itself or its actions, both of which remained popular.111
2. Confirmation Wars. — Republican senators also took the extraordinary action of preventing the agency from having a confirmed leader.
Forty-four Republicans declared on May 5, 2011, that they would block
the confirmation of any person as director of the CFPB until structural
changes were enacted into law.112 “No Accountability, No Confirmation”
was the headline adopted by Senator Richard Shelby’s office.113 Senator
Shelby himself claimed, incorrectly, that the agency has “unfettered authority to regulate businesses that extend consumer credit.”114 By July,
the Chamber of Commerce had produced a twenty-seven-page statement systematically arguing that the CFPB’s director would have “unprecedented unchecked power of extraordinary breadth” and calling for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
106 Gary Rivlin & Susan Antilla, No Protection for Protectors, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 18, 2017,
9:03 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/18/wall-street-wants-to-kill-the-agency-protectingamericans-from-financial-scams [https://perma.cc/6STE-KV3U].
107 $500K Ad Campaign Against CFPB Launches, SUBPRIME (Nov. 10, 2015, 11:03 AM),
https://www.autoremarketing.com/subprime/500k-ad-campaign-against-cfpb-launches
[https://perma.cc/MV9V-L2GS].
108 Dennis Shaul, Opinion, What Went Wrong with the CFPB, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 19, 2017,
1:25
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-went-wrong-with-the-cfpb-1511072512
[https://perma.cc/3EF7-9ZFY].
109 Norbert J. Michel, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Undermines Economic
Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/
commentary/the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-undermines-economic-freedom
[https://perma.cc/E7RC-626Q].
110 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 3 (2016),
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KD89-3F78].
111 See McCoy, supra note 32, at 2568.
112 News Release, Sen. Richard Shelby, 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No
Confirmation (May 5, 2011), https://www.shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/44-u-s-sens-toobama-no-accountability-no-confirmation [https://perma.cc/4L2N-C6HL].
113 Id.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
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structural reforms.115 The Chamber stopped short of calling the
agency’s structure unconstitutional, but it sang a constitutional tune,
referring to “checks and balances” eight times.116
In the face of intransigent Republican opposition, President Obama
chose not to nominate then-Professor Warren to run the CFPB in July
2011, and instead picked former Ohio Attorney General Richard
Cordray with the hope he might pass muster with Republicans in the
Senate.117 A few months later, in December 2011, Republicans used the
threat of a filibuster to block Cordray’s nomination, citing once again
their demands for structural reforms to the agency.118
The confirmation battle over Cordray wasn’t important simply as a
matter of political hardball. It was also a tactic to prevent the regulation
of financial institutions. A legal opinion from the Treasury and Federal
Reserve Inspectors General had concluded that without a confirmed
head, the CFPB could not exercise its powers to conduct rulemakings
under its new legal authorities; take action to prohibit unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices; or supervise nondepository financial institutions.119 In other words, the CFPB would not get its full powers without
having a Senate-confirmed leader.120
Playing political hardball himself, President Obama ultimately gave
recess appointments to Cordray and three others in January
2012,121 leading to lawsuits and ultimately the Supreme Court’s decision
in NLRB v. Noel Canning122 (which, like Seila, does not go into the fe-
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115 See Statement, U.S. Chamber of Com., Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the
Financial Crisis 4 (July 19, 2011), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pincus
Testimony71911.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE5A-GQJ3].
116 See id. at 3, 5–7, 13, 27.
117 See Jessica Yellin, Obama Will Nominate Cordray to Head New Consumer Protection Bureau,
CNN (July 18, 2011, 1:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/18/consumer.bureau/
index.html [https://perma.cc/T658-WHU9].
118 See Kevin Wack, Senate Republicans Block Cordray Nomination, AM. BANKER (Dec. 8,
2011, 11:24 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/senate-republicans-block-cordraynomination [https://perma.cc/J9HK-HV9T].
119 Wilmarth, supra note 65, at 897; Letter from Eric M. Thorson & Elizabeth A. Coleman to
Rep. Spencer Bachus & Rep. Judy Biggert, forwarding “Joint Response by the Inspectors General
of the Department of the Treasury and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Request
for Information Regarding the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,” at 6–7 (Jan. 10, 2011).
120 Professor Art Wilmarth has pointed out that restraining the CFPB in this way had the effect
of benefitting non-banks vis-à-vis banks — and he has also shown that some bankers were willing
to accept an unlevel playing field in order to prevent the CFPB from gaining its full powers.
Wilmarth, supra note 65, at 897–99.
121 Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordraynamed-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html [https://perma.cc/69GH-LREF].
122 573 U.S. 513 (2014).

368

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:352

rocious political battles being waged between the branches and the economic stakes behind them).123 Only after Senate Democrats threatened to
change the filibuster rules in July 2013 was Cordray finally confirmed.124
3. New Legislation and Weaponized Oversight. — After Republicans
captured the House of Representatives in 2010, they began a multi-year
effort to weaken and roll back the agency’s authority, introducing new
legislation and weaponizing their oversight powers.125 Almost immediately upon taking the House, Republicans introduced multiple pieces of
legislation designed to make the CFPB a multimember commission, to
strengthen the veto over the CFPB’s rulemakings, and to subject the
agency to congressional appropriations rather than getting its funding
from the Fed’s budget.126 On the first anniversary of Dodd-Frank, the
House passed major reforms to the CFPB.127
Over the coming years, new legislative proposals to weaken the
agency got bolder and more creative. One bill would have eliminated
most of the CFPB’s supervisory and enforcement powers, ended its
independent funding source, made the agency’s public consumer complaint database secret, halted its authority to regulate small loans like
payday lending, reduced the pay of agency employees, and, of course,
made the director removable at will.128 Another would have prevented
the agency from collecting loan data on small and minority businesses,
and replaced the notice-and-comment rulemaking process with a more
cumbersome one that has been shown to lengthen the rulemaking process by more than five times.129 At one point, Republicans also proposed

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
123 See id. at 520–22. For a discussion of how playing hardball can regulate separation of powers
disputes, see David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 39–48
(2014).
124 Emily Stephenson, Senate Confirms Cordray as Consumer Bureau Chief, REUTERS (July 16,
2013, 11:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-cordray/senate-confirmscordray-as-consumer-bureau-chief-idUSBRE96F0UD20130716 [https://perma.cc/Q2HZ-B3Q7].
125 See generally David C.W. Parker & Matthew Dull, The Weaponization of Congressional
Oversight, in POLITICS TO THE EXTREME: AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 47 (Scott A. Frish & Sean Q. Kelly eds., 2013).
126 H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing to replace the Director of the CFPB with a fivemember Commission); H.R. Res. 358, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing to strengthen the review authority of the FSOC); H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing that the CFPB be subjected to
regular appropriations); Wilmarth, supra note 65, at 890–91.
127 Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1315,
112th Cong. (as passed by House, July 21, 2011) (passed by a vote of 241–173); Wilmarth, supra
note 65, at 891–92.
128 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
129 Community Lending Enhancement and Regulatory Relief (CLEARR) Act of 2017, H.R. 2133,
115th Cong. (2017). The replacement for notice and comment is the Magnuson-Moss process that
the FTC must use in consumer rulemaking. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the
“Mossified” Procedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979, 1982–84 (2015).
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using budget reconciliation to end independent funding for the agency.130
All told, between 2011 and 2017, Republicans introduced 135 bills and
resolutions designed to hamper or kill the agency.131 Importantly, many
of these proposals took aim at areas in which the CFPB had been
successful, such as its enforcement actions against Wells Fargo and its
consumer complaint hotline.132
At the same time, House Republicans used their oversight powers in
extraordinary ways, weaponizing them to tie up the agency and its leadership in paperwork, legal battles, and invented scandals. They (and
the Chamber of Commerce) attacked the CFPB for the cost of renovating its headquarters,133 a “run-down concrete building” that had not been
remodeled since 1976.134 When they appealed to the Inspector General
to investigate plans for this “Taj Mahal,”135 it found that
“construction costs appear reasonable”136 and appropriate cost controls
were in place.137 The National Capital Planning Commission even
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
130 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 115TH CONG., THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU IN PERSPECTIVE 22–23 (2017), https://
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cfpb_staff_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8LJ-JAES].
131 Rivlin & Antilla, supra note 106.
132 DEMOCRATIC STAFF, supra note 130, at 21–22.
133 Tim Devaney, GOP Blasts $215M Cost for Consumer Bureau Office with Waterfall, THE
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Hackbarth, Out of Control: CFPB Renovation Costs Balloon Nearly 400%, U.S. CHAMBER COM.
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(July 16, 2014, 12:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-10/republicans-useiffy-math-to-attack-cfpb-office-renovation [https://perma.cc/KT5A-DQMM]; CONSUMER FIN.
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(2014),
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TRIB. (July 23, 2015, 2:46 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/la-fi-mh-cfpb-republicans20150723-column.html [https://perma.cc/26BR-9453].
136 OFF.
OF
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
2015-FMIC-C-012,
CFPB
HEADQUARTERS
CONSTRUCTION COSTS APPEAR REASONABLE AND CONTROLS ARE DESIGNED
APPROPRIATELY 6 (2015),
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137 Id. at 12. For more information regarding the CFPB’s budgetary process for the renovation,
see Letter from Off. of Inspector Gen., Response to the January 29, 2014, Congressional Request
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“commend[ed]” the CFPB and the General Services Administration for
the renovations.138
At times oversight seemed designed to prevent the agency from accomplishing its statutorily directed obligations. Dodd-Frank required
the CFPB to study mandatory arbitration clauses and issue rules consistent with its findings.139 Five days before the final rule went public,
Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling threatened Cordray with contempt proceedings if he promulgated the rule prior to the agency
responding to his requests for thousands of documents.140 House
Republicans had flooded the agency with oversight requests, writing
ninety letters of inquiry to the agency between 2014 and 2017 and requiring the agency to produce 170,000 pages of documents (which it
did).141 Chairman Hensarling even adopted the practice of issuing
unilateral subpoenas — without committee debate or vote — and proceeded to subpoena the CFPB twenty times, leading to more than forty
hours of staff depositions.142
When President Trump entered office in 2017, Republicans expanded their arsenal against the agency. They took up an innovative
use for the Congressional Review Act143 (CRA). The CRA is meant to
allow Congress to override an agency rulemaking by a majority vote
and the President’s signature.144 The Republicans used it to overturn
the CFPB’s arbitration rule (with Vice President Pence’s tiebreaking
vote),145 and then they went further and used it to overturn CFPB guidance on auto lending.146 By the end of 2017, Republicans were even
attacking the agency for inaction. After the CFPB issued a historic fine
against Wells Fargo for fraudulently opening accounts for unknowing

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
138 Executive Director’s Recommendation: CFPB Building Modernization, NAT’L CAP. PLAN.
COMM’N 2 (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.ncpc.gov/docs/actions/2016February/Consumer_
Financial_Protection_Bureau_Headquarters_Moderization_Recommendation_0162_Feb2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2F5X-R8DB]; Commission Meeting, NAT’L CAP. PLAN. COMM’N 23, 29 (Feb. 4,
2016), transcript available at https://www.ncpc.gov/docs/open_gov_files/transcripts/2016/
2016_02_04_NCPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9T5-5N67].
139 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)–(b).
140 DEMOCRATIC STAFF, supra note 130, at 25–26.
141 Id. at 21.
142 Id.
143 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808.
144 Id. §§ 801–802.
145 See Rivlin & Antilla, supra note 106.
146 Adam Levitin, Congressional Review Act Confusion: Indirect Auto Lending Guidance
Edition (a/k/a The Fast & The Pointless), CREDIT SLIPS (Apr. 17, 2018, 10:40 PM),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/04/congressional-review-act-confusion.html
[https://perma.cc/6S6H-UEUT].
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customers,147 Republicans criticized Cordray for not being aggressive
enough.148
C. The Fox in the Henhouse
“It’s time to fire King Richard,” Senator Ben Sasse commented prior
to Donald Trump’s inauguration.149 Almost a year later, in November
2017, Cordray resigned as head of the CFPB and designated his chief of
staff Leondra English as the CFPB’s interim director.150 President
Trump, a few hours later, appointed OMB director Mick Mulvaney as
interim director.151 The schism at the CFPB immediately went to the
courts, with English arguing that Dodd-Frank explicitly gave Cordray
the power to choose an interim director and the Trump Administration
countering that the terms of the Federal Vacancies Act governed.152
English ended her challenge half a year later when President Trump
nominated Kathy Kraninger to run the Bureau.153
In control of the CFPB, Mulvaney and then Kraninger took to
dismantling the financial watchdog from the inside. Mulvaney had
opposed the agency vehemently as a congressman and even sponsored
legislation to eliminate it.154 Now at the helm of the agency he detested,
Mulvaney went systematically through the agency’s structures, powers,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2co9hQK [https://perma.cc/U35J-RDCG].
148 Kate Berry & Ian McKendry, Cordray Lied, Botched Wells Investigation: GOP Report, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 19, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-richard-cordraylied-botched-wells-fargo-investigation-gop-report [https://perma.cc/T6KG-FF8L]; Press Release,
Jeb Hensarling, ICYMI: The CFPB Is Unconstitutional so Let’s Make It Better (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://republicans-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=402789
[https://perma.cc/MFR9-DTM9].
149 Rivlin & Antilla, supra note 106.
150 Kevin McCoy, Richard Cordray Resigns as Director of Consumer Financial Protection
TODAY
(Nov.
24,
2017,
4:48
PM),
https://www.
Bureau,
USA
usatoday.com/story/money/2017/11/24/richard-cordray-resigns-director-consumer-financialprotection-bureau/893489001 [https://perma.cc/CK2L-RQ8W]; Victoria Guida & Katy O’Donnell,
Battle Over CFPB Leadership Ends as Mulvaney Challenger Resigns, POLITICO (July 6, 2018, 4:32
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/06/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-leadershipbattle-674254 [https://perma.cc/86Z2-73EG].
151 Avie Schneider, Trump Names His Budget Chief as Interim Head of Consumer Protection
Agency,
NPR
(Nov.
24,
2017,
10:03
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/11/24/566406495/trump-names-his-budget-chief-as-interim-head-of-consumerprotection-agency [https://perma.cc/CV44-XFJY].
152 Andrew Rudalevige, It’s the Game of Vacancies at the CFPB. Watch Out for the Bureaucratic
Duel of Conflicting Statutes., WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:02 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/29/its-the-game-of-vacancies-at-the-cfpbwatch-out-for-the-bureaucratic-duel-of-conflicting-statutes [https://perma.cc/G9S4-3WZ4].
153 Guida & O’Donnell, supra note 150.
154 Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a Bureaucracy from
Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html [https://perma.cc/32GB-SXR3].
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and operations to twist them to serve his preferences. In area after
area — enforcement, rulemaking, supervisions, funding, personnel, and
culture — Mulvaney went to war.
He halted new enforcement actions and started withdrawing ongoing
enforcement actions, particularly against payday lenders.155 In 2018, the
CFPB undertook only eleven enforcement actions, a fraction of the fiftyfive it announced in 2015.156 When it came to rulemaking, Mulvaney
began by reconsidering payday lending rules157 and dropping plans for
rules on overdraft payments and student loan servicing.158 Mulvaney’s
CFPB decided it would no longer exercise its supervisory powers to
prevent financial institutions from targeting servicemembers with
fraudulent or abusive products.159 He downgraded the status of the student lending office and the office of fair lending by merging them into
other offices.160 And he told the Federal Reserve that the CFPB did not
need any new funding.161
The CFPB opponent-turned-leader ordered a hiring freeze upon
taking over the agency, and effectively made it permanent as part of a
strategy of attrition to reduce the capacity of the agency to regulate and
enforce the laws.162 He tapped political appointees to be “policy associate directors” who would shadow the career civil service bureau chiefs,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
155 Id.; see Devin Leonard & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Mick Mulvaney Is Having a Blast Running
the Agency He Detests, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 25, 2018, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-25/mick-mulvaney-on-the-cfpb-we-re-stillelizabeth-warren-s-child [https://perma.cc/XF4U-J45Y]; Ken Sweet, Under Trump, a Voice for the
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://
American
Consumer
Goes
Silent,
AP
apnews.com/c80a20db4a5942e7af9632b0cbf75700 [https://perma.cc/6TWX-UGEM]].
156 CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 15 (2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37AE-Y64F].
157 Confessore, supra note 154.
158 Kate Berry, From Overdraft to HMDA, Rulemaking Has New Look at Mulvaney’s CFPB, AM.
BANKER,
https://www.americanbanker.com/list/from-overdraft-to-hmda-rulemaking-has-newlook-at-mick-mulvaneys-cfpb [https://perma.cc/3BM5-DR82].
159 Emily Stewart, The Trump Administration Is Dismantling Financial Protections for the
(Aug.
14,
2018,
8:30
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andMilitary,
VOX
politics/2018/8/14/17684810/military-lending-act-mick-mulvaney-cfpb-loans
[https://perma.cc/FUT5-7HRL]; McCoy, supra note 32, at 2590–91.
160 McCoy, supra note 32, at 2592–93; Glenn Thrush & Stacy Cowley, Mulvaney Downgrades
Student Loan Unit in Consumer Bureau Reshuffle, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2I21Ijk [https://perma.cc/5U36-WFMK].
161 Confessore, supra note 154; Michael Grunwald, Mulvaney Requests No Funding for
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2018/01/18/mulvaney-funding-consumer-bureau-cordray-345495
[https://perma.cc/3XYL-B9DK].
162 See Ryan Rainey, CFPB Staffing Drops for 4th Straight Quarter, Longest Since Agency
Opened, MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 6, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://morningconsult.com/
2018/04/06/cfpb-staffing-drops-for-4th-straight-quarter-longest-since-agency-opened
[https://perma.cc/R4HV-5954].
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implicitly to ensure they would comply with the Administration’s
political preferences.163 New appointees often came from the ranks of
those who had opposed the agency and worked to weaken it.164 And
they summarily dismissed every member of the agency’s Consumer
Advisory Board, Community Bank Advisory Council, and Credit Union
Advisory Council.165
Finally, Mulvaney took on a number of symbolic actions to break
the consumer-focused, mission-driven culture of the agency. His staff
rewrote the CFPB’s mission statement to include a focus on “unduly
burdensome regulations.”166 They changed the CFPB’s logo, sign, and
name to the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.”167 This cosmetic and symbolic change would cost the agency between $9 and $19
million and financial firms about $300 million.168 Mulvaney even
changed the namesake of the agency’s honors program for graduating
law students from noted consumer lawyer and Supreme Court Justice
Louis D. Brandeis to Justice Joseph Story. Justice Story, who is best
known for his commentaries on the Constitution, has no obvious link to
consumer issues.169
According to one commentator, Mulvaney left the CFPB in a “vegetative state.”170 Director Kraninger’s tenure in office continued the
trend. Kraninger refused to get refunds for consumers when a payday
lender extracted money from 6,829 consumer bank accounts without
their permission — even though the lender offered to pay $1.6 million
in restitution.171 And in the midst of the COVID-19 economic crisis,
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Confessore, supra note 154.
Hannah Levintova, Want to Get Hired by the CFPB? Say You Know How to Destroy It.,
MOTHER JONES (June 25, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/cfpb-politicalappointees-resumes-mick-mulvaney [https://perma.cc/Y8SY-G7DR].
165 Hannah Levintova, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Just Dismissed 61 Consumer
Protection Advisors, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2018/06/cfpb-advisory-boards-fired [https://perma.cc/UDT9-KTBH].
166 See Confessore, supra note 154.
167 See Emily Stewart, New CFPB Director Reverses Mick Mulvaney’s Pettiest Move as Acting
(Dec.
20,
2018,
12:50
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andDirector,
VOX
politics/2018/12/20/18150251/cfpb-logo-mick-mulvaney-kathy-kraninger-bcfp
[https://perma.cc/U3PG-W9TV].
168 Id.
169 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Announcing the Joseph Story Honors Attorney
Program (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/announcing-josephstory-honors-attorney-program [https://perma.cc/FUT5-7HRL].
170 Bess Levin, Mick Mulvaney Won’t Rest Until He’s Exorcised Elizabeth Warren from the
C.F.P.B., VANITY FAIR (May 25, 2018) https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/05/mick-mulvaneyelizabeth-warren-exorcism [https://perma.cc/HE8E-8FJX].
171 Kate Berry & Neil Haggerty, Dems Unload on CFPB’s Kraninger: “You Are Absolutely
Worthless,” AM. BANKER (Oct. 16, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/demsunload-on-cfpbs-kraninger-you-are-absolutely-worthless [https://perma.cc/PCS6-RLAC].
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with millions unemployed and tens of thousands of consumer complaints flooding into the CFPB’s offices, Kraninger has instead sought
to weaken or delay rules relating to mortgage lenders and credit card
companies.172
D. Challenging the CFPB
In light of the battle over the agency, it might not seem surprising
that such a heated political brawl would take on a constitutional valence
and that a constitutional challenge would reach the Supreme Court. But
it should be at least somewhat puzzling, given what the outcome was
likely to be.
The reason is that in 2010, the Supreme Court decided a case called
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board. Free
Enterprise Fund argued that the accounting agency’s for-cause removal
restrictions rendered it unconstitutional because it was located within
the Securities and Exchange Commission, another independent
agency.173 This nestled system created a double-insulation from presidential removal. Free Enterprise Fund raised a variety of unitary executive theory arguments that would also surface in the CFPB case, but
what is notable is that the Court stopped short of invalidating the
PCAOB wholesale.174 Rather, it found that the removal provision was
severable from the rest of the statute.175 The PCAOB continued to operate, but board members would be subject to at-will removal from
office.176
Four years later, the CFPB issued charges against mortgage lender
PHH for violating the Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA) by soliciting reinsurance kickbacks from mortgage insurers in
exchange for steering business to them.177 PHH responded by challenging the constitutionality of the agency’s structure, a case it ultimately
lost en banc in the D.C. Circuit in 2018,178 after Cordray had left the
agency and President Trump picked Mulvaney as interim successor.
Given Free Enterprise Fund, it is not entirely clear why it made
sense for PHH to challenge the constitutionality of the CFPB starting
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
172 See Katy O’Donnell, Consumer Bureau Draws Fire for Pro-business Tilt During Crisis,
POLITICO (May 17, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/16/consumer-bureaupro-business-tilt-coronavirus-crisis-261394 [https://perma.cc/97FU-ZQ8S].
173 See id. at 487.
174 See id. at 487–88.
175 Id. at 508.
176 Id. at 507. Notably, the accounting firm (and member of Free Enterprise Fund) did not get
any relief from the case. See Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal Puzzle,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371, 1373–74 (2012) (noting the “hollow victory” for the challengers, id.
at 1373).
177 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
178 Id. at 84.
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in 2014. Free Enterprise Fund provided strong evidence that the
Roberts Court’s remedy for a constitutional violation of this type would
be to sever the removal provision and let the agency continue to function. PHH would therefore not have been off the hook had it won its
challenge. It is possible PHH thought a victory would enable the next
Republican President, perhaps arriving in 2017, to fire Cordray and pick
a new director who would grant them relief. But through much of the
2016 election cycle, the conventional wisdom was that Hillary Clinton
would become President, not Donald Trump.
Seila’s actions are equally puzzling, if not more so. After losing its
case in district court, Seila appealed to the Ninth Circuit in 2017179 and
continued its case after Cordray had departed later that year and
Mulvaney was interim director. In spite of systematically attempting to
dismantle the agency, the now Trump-controlled CFPB continued to
press its case against Seila. Perhaps this was to keep Seila’s constitutional case alive. But again, it is unclear why that mattered much, given
the likely remedy after Free Enterprise Fund.
So how do we explain the case? I think there are two likely answers.
First, as we have seen, for the entirety of the last decade, the CFPB has
been the subject of relentless attacks — to prevent it from coming into
being, weaken it, reform it, abolish it, and eviscerate it from the inside.
This political and economic battle — a battle between Republicans and
Democrats, between financial institutions and ordinary families, between Wall Street and Washington — simply gained a momentum that
couldn’t be stopped. The interests opposed to the agency had mobilized
forces so widely that many others embraced the project to kill it. Even
if there were only a small chance of a broader, more radical victory —
there was still a chance. The second possibility, which is not in conflict
with the first, is that the underlying aims of the case were to advance
the constitutional vision of the unitary executive. There too, there was
a chance that a Supreme Court with new Justices might go further than
the Free Enterprise Court.
II. SEILA AND THE RISE OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Under the unitary executive theory, Article II, section 1 of the
Constitution, which vests “the executive Power” in the President, combines with the Take Care Clause to “creat[e] a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control of the President.”180 Unitary
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179 Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law, LLC, No. 17-cv-01081 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2017), 2017 WL 6536586; Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-56324).
180 Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992).
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executive theorists argue that the President holds “all” of the executive
power.181 This includes, on their account, the power to “direct, control,
and supervise inferior officers or agencies.”182 Among the consequences
is that congressionally specified removal criteria are unconstitutional.183
The Seila Court adopts much of the unitary executive theory’s reasoning. This Part places Seila in a second context: the decades-long rise
of the unitary executive theory. It first recounts how the theory grew
within the Justice Department in the 1980s, then in the academy in the
1990s. By the 2000s, the theory was prominent and, during the George
W. Bush Administration, commonly invoked. Seila should be seen as
part of this broader legal movement, and the success of the movement
in providing support for the theory can partly explain the brevity of the
Court’s opinion. In her skillful dissent, Justice Kagan takes aim at each
of the pillars of the majority’s approach with devastating effect. Her
counterattack leaves the reader feeling that the 5–4 divide is not a mere
difference of interpretation, but rather a serious political confrontation.
A. The Conservative Legal Movement and the
Rise of the Unitary Executive Theory
Debates over the President’s ability to remove executive branch officers have existed throughout American constitutional history and have
regularly been some of the most fiercely battled political and legal issues.184 But the modern debate over the removal power started during
the Reagan Administration with the rise of the unitary executive theory.185 Based on interviews, documents, and data collection, Professor
Amanda Hollis-Brusky has shown how individuals and groups associated with the conservative legal movement worked from the 1980s
through the 2000s to expand the plausibility and legitimacy of the
unitary executive theory.186 The story of the theory’s rise is not the traditional one offered under the rubric of popular constitutionalism, which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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182
183

Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 1165–66. Other consequences include the ability of the President to supervise agencies.
See generally, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE 168 (2009) (discussing regulatory
review).
184 See generally J. DAVID ALVIS, JEREMY D. BAILEY & F. FLAGG TAYLOR IV, THE
CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010 (2013). As for the ferocity, consider the controversy
over the Second Bank of the United States in the Jackson Administration, id. at 74, and the Tenure
of Office Act during the Andrew Johnson Administration, id. at 106.
185 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First HalfCentury, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1451, 1452–53 (1997) (noting that “[t]his modern debate began
with claims of executive authority advanced by President Reagan, whose administration continually questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies and of independent counsels,” id. at
1452).
186 Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual
Investment in the Unitary Executive Theory, 1981–2000, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 197, 200 (2011). For
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emphasizes the importance of popular opinion.187 Rather, it was largely
a function of shifting opinions among legal elites. As Professor Jack
Balkin has noted, arguments can go from “off the wall” to “on the wall”
quickly when embraced by establishment politicians, and that in
turn requires an intellectual foundation and often social movement
support.188
In the 1970s, the unitary theory per se hardly existed, with only a
few scattered references in the legal literature.189 After the election of
President Reagan and particularly after the selection of Ed Meese as
Attorney General, the theory began to grow in prominence. For
conservatives in the Administration, as Professor and former Reagan
Solicitor General Charles Fried has recounted, the Reagan Revolution
had two parts. The first was an economic revolution to prevent politicians from “regulat[ing] the economy” and “redistribut[ing] wealth.”190
The second was a legal revolution: “[C]ourts should be more disciplined,
less adventurous and political in interpreting the law, especially the law
of the Constitution; [and] the President must be allowed a strong hand
in governing the nation and providing leadership . . . .”191
Under Attorney General Meese, the Justice Department welcomed
and encouraged intellectual discussion about the law, particularly in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
works on the conservative legal movement, see generally MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE
MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK
FROM LIBERALS (2013); AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCE: THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015); STEVEN M.
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
OF THE LAW (2008).
187 By the traditional popular constitutionalism story, I mean a story of social movements or
broad public understanding. The literature on popular constitutionalism is voluminous. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term — Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Popular
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959 (2004). My sense is that even with the very
public battle over the CFPB, public mobilization around the variety of separation of powers arguments in the case is a far cry from, for example, similar arguments around the Second Amendment
leading to District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). That case is a good example of
conservative popular constitutionalism that involved shifts in opinions among legal elites and a
social movement. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term — Comment: Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008).
188 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/
258040 [https://perma.cc/NV88-VXS7].
189 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 198–99.
190 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION — A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 17–18 (1991); see also Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 201; DAVID A.
STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: WHY THE REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED 103
(1986) (“Sweeping deregulation was another pillar of the supply-side platform.”).
191 FRIED, supra note 190, at 17–18.
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ways that advanced the conservative movement’s aims to expand presidential power. The Attorney General hosted seminars and workshops,
including on the separation of powers and the unitary executive theory,
in order to persuade skeptics — including Fried, who himself wasn’t
initially “committed to th[e] program.”192 The push for greater presidential power largely focused on four areas: Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
opinions, presidential signing statements, regulatory review of agencies,
and Supreme Court arguments.
Over the course of the 1980s, the Reagan Administration issued
seven OLC opinions that mentioned the unitary theory. Notably, the
theory evolved over time. In 1981, it was described “in general and
rather amorphous terms as the constitutional basis for the President’s
role in ensuring ‘uniform and unitary’ execution of the laws.”193 But,
Hollis-Brusky notes, it had “evolved into the ‘principle of the unitary
executive’” by 1983.194 Some of these opinions, written by then-head of
the Office of Legal Counsel Theodore Olson, tried to rein in different
forms of agency independence.195
The “signing statement initiative,” a second effort, was intended not
to expound the unitary executive as doctrine, but to express it in practice. The President would issue signing statements in order to give agencies guidance on the President’s view of legislation.196
The Reagan Administration also moved to gain more control over
regulatory agencies. President Reagan required executive branch agencies to adopt rules based on cost-benefit analysis if permitted by statute,
and to submit rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
for review.197 Despite an OLC opinion that it could apply the executive
order to independent agencies, the administration declined to do so for
political reasons.198 Still, it saw independent commissioners as “the extreme example, a kind of emblem, of one of the biggest obstacles to the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006). Bradley and Posner note
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administration’s program,”199 and members of the Administration
wanted a Supreme Court case declaring “that statutory limitations on
their removal were unconstitutional.”200 As Attorney General Meese
said in a 1985 speech, “federal agencies performing executive functions
are themselves properly agents of the executive. They are not ‘quasi’
this or ‘independent’ that.”201
The marquee event for the removal power during the Reagan
Administration was Morrison v. Olson,202 a 1988 case challenging the
constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act.203 In his 2–1 opinion in the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Silberman referred to the unitary executive theory by name ten times in
holding that the provisions were unconstitutional.204 At the Supreme
Court, the government relied on the Take Care Clause to argue that the
removal restriction was impermissible.205 Solicitor General Fried later
said that he had been persuaded by Meese’s Department of Justice seminars.206 By an 8–1 margin, with only Justice Scalia dissenting, the
Supreme Court rejected the President’s power to remove the independent counsel, upholding the statute and in the process actually broadening
the scope of the existing rule under Humphrey’s Executor.207 Justice
Scalia’s dissent had referenced the theory twice by name,208 but the case
was a devastating defeat for the unitary theory’s attempt to establish a
presidential removal power. So thorough was the loss that after Morrison
reversed him, Judge Silberman analogized his opinion to Pickett’s
Charge at Gettysburg, the “high water mark” of the Confederacy.209
But it wasn’t. Justice Scalia’s dissent gave the unitary executive new
life. From 1973 to 1988, Hollis-Brusky reports, the theory was mentioned by name in thirty-eight law review articles.210 In the four years
after Morrison, seventy-six articles mentioned it.211 Throughout the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
199
200
201

FRIED, supra note 190, at 154–55.
Id. at 157.
Stack, supra note 195, at 413 (quoting Edwin Meese, III, Towards Increased Government
Accountability, 32 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 406, 408 (1985)).
202 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
203 For a history of the case, with relevant context to the rise of the unitary executive, see Stack,
supra note 195, at 401.
204 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d, 487 U.S. 654; Hollis-Brusky, supra
note 186, at 208. For a discussion of the case, see Stack, supra note 195, at 424.
205 See Brief for Appellee, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279), 1987 WL 880907, at *18–20;
Stack, supra note 195, at 425.
206 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 207.
207 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669.
208 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727, 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at
209.
209 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 208 n.63 (quoting Laurence Silberman, Panel I: Agency
Autonomy and the Unitary Executive, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 495, 500 (1990)).
210 Id. at 209–10.
211 See id. at 210–11.
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1990s and into the 2000s, Federalist Society scholars took up the project
of articulating the theory in great detail.212 Articles put forward the
textual and structural case for the theory,213 the historical case for the
theory,214 and even the functional arguments in its favor.215 This impressive, systematic body of scholarship not only expanded the Overton window of legal argument, it also sparked more and more scholarship discussing the theory itself. From 2001 to 2008, there were 453 articles
discussing the unitary executive.216
Along with a stronger academic pedigree, the theory found a second
life in government.217 The Reagan Administration had mentioned the
unitary executive in twelve executive branch documents; the George W.
Bush Administration mentioned it in ninety.218 During the Bush
Administration, the unitary executive found its way into OLC opinions
on legal issues related to the war on terror, and it undergirded greater
oversight of federal agencies.219 By the time of Free Enterprise Fund in
2010 and Seila in 2020, the unitary executive theory had become standard
in separation of powers debates — particularly among conservatives.
B. Seila and the Emergence of a Presidential Removal Power
Writing for a 5–4 majority on the constitutional question in Seila,
Chief Justice Roberts adopted much of the unitary executive theory’s
reasoning.220 “‘[T]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,’
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
212
213

Id. at 219–20.
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 180.
214 See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE (2008); Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 185; Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi &
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601
(2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During
the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2004).
215 See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995).
216 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 228.
217 The two, as Metzger has noted in the related context of the administrative state, can be reinforcing. See Metzger, supra note 64, at 33 (“[T]here is a mutually reinforcing relationship between
judicial and academic attacks on the administrative state.”).
218 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 199.
219 See SHANE, supra note 183, at 156–57; Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 235.
220 The majority on the constitutional question consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The majority on the severability issue comprised Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Chief
Justice Roberts first addressed three arguments that the Court should not reach the merits: (1) that
the demand issued to Seila was not “traceable” to the constitutional defect and that, in removal
cases, the action would not have been taken if the official in question were removable, Seila, 140 S.
Ct. at 2195; (2) that the constitutionality of the removal power should be assessed in the context of
a contested removal; and (3) that there was no “adverseness” because the parties agreed, id. at 2196;
see id. at 2195–97. These arguments were made by the court-appointed amicus because the government supported Seila’s argument. Id. at 2195.
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who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’” Chief
Justice Roberts began.221 He noted that the “entire” executive power
belonged to the President,222 having elsewhere mentioned that “all of it”
is the President’s.223 This power “generally includes the ability to remove executive officials, for it is ‘only the authority that can remove’
such officials that they ‘must fear and, in the performance of [their]
functions, obey.’”224
The Chief Justice briefly noted that this view was confirmed by history and precedent, and in two paragraphs summarized the so-called
“Decision of 1789,” in which the first Congress debated removals while
creating the first federal government departments, and Myers v. United
States,225 in which Chief Justice Taft recognized “the President’s prerogative to remove executive officials.”226 After referencing his own
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, Chief Justice Roberts announced two
exceptions to the “President’s unrestricted removal power.”227 The first
was based on Humphrey’s Executor. That case was decided nine years
after Myers and all but overturned it while upholding a law enabling
Federal Trade Commissioners to serve for a term of years, with removal
for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office.228 Roberts characterized Humphrey’s Executor narrowly, stating that the 1935 Court saw the
FTC as not exercising substantial executive power.229 The second exception, which explained Morrison, was for “inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking” role.230
Applying this framework to the CFPB, the Chief Justice argued that
the agency fit into neither exception.231 It exercised legislative, judicial,
and executive functions, and, unlike the FTC, was not a multimember
commission. The CFPB director was also plainly not an inferior officer.
The agency’s structure was “wholly unprecedented,” an “indication of
[a] severe constitutional problem.”232 Chief Justice Roberts argued that
four other examples of single-director agencies with removal protections
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 2197 (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; then quoting id. art. II, § 3).
Id.
Id. at 2191.
Id. at 2197 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.
Id. at 2198.
Id. For a discussion, see Jane Manners & Lev Menand, Presidential Removal: Defining
Inefficiency, Neglect of Duty, and Malfeasance in Office, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3520377 [https://perma.cc/75YS-9BDY].
229 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2198–99.
230 Id. at 2199–200.
231 Id. at 2200.
232 Id. at 2201 (alteration in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).

382

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:352

were short in duration or “modern and contested.”233 The agency’s design also violated the constitutional structure because the Constitution
“avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual” except the President.234 The Chief Justice noted that the Framers’ “constitutional strategy [was] straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to
the people through regular elections.”235 The CFPB’s structure was thus
unconstitutional because it “vest[ed] significant governmental power in
the hands of a single individual accountable to no one.”236 Turning to
the remedy, Chief Justice Roberts found that the removal restriction was
severable from the rest of the statute, citing Free Enterprise Fund.237
Justice Thomas dissented from the severability analysis, arguing that
the remedy should simply be to not enforce the CFPB’s actions.238 He
also argued that Humphrey’s Executor was unconstitutional and should
be overturned outright, instead of narrowed.239 Still, he was willing to
join the Chief Justice because the opinion “limit[ed] Humphrey’s
Executor to ‘multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial
executive power.’”240 Justice Thomas then offered a full-throated articulation of the unitary executive theory that included complete executive
power over removals.241
Between the two opinions, five Justices have embraced much or all
of the logic and reasoning of the unitary executive theory with respect
to removals. The President’s “executive power” and the Take Care
Clause are the foundation for this largely preclusive removal power, and
these Justices read history and precedents to support that position.
Declared all but dead by Judge Silberman after the 8–1 defeat in
Morrison, the unitary theory and the removal power rose again — and
they now have a 5–4 majority on the Supreme Court.
C. The Case Against Seila
What is perhaps most surprising about Seila’s treatment of text and
structure is not that the Court came to interpretive judgments in these
areas, but that it did so with comparatively little analysis or discussion,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233 Id. at 2201–02. These are the Civil War–era Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Special
Counsel, Social Security Administrator, and head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Id.
234 Id. at 2202.
235 Id. at 2203.
236 Id. Chief Justice Roberts also noted that some Presidents might never get to nominate a
CFPB director, and the CFPB’s funding is not appropriated by Congress. Id. at 2204.
237 Id. at 2209.
238 Id. at 2219 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Gorsuch joined
Justice Thomas’s partial dissent.
239 Id. at 2212.
240 Id. at 2211 (quoting id. at 2199 (majority opinion) (emphasis added)).
241 See id. at 2212–19.
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given the rebuttals both in Justice Kagan’s spirited dissent and in a
growing body of scholarship undermining those judgments. Many of
these arguments are well known and covered in Justice Kagan’s dissent,
but a few are worth reiterating.
First, the claim that “executive power” includes “the ability to remove executive officials.”242 Putting aside the atextual (and aggrandizing) references to “all of” or the “entire” executive power, one of the central debates in removal cases is whether the power to remove a
subordinate is “executive” in nature. The text of the Constitution does
not define “executive,” and Justice Kagan notes that the Morrison Court
was unwilling to find a preclusive, unrestrictable removal power because of the term’s generality.243 The text itself gives a strong clue that
“executive” cannot hold such a meaning. Under the Opinions Clause in
Article II, the President is explicitly authorized to ask subordinates for
their written opinions.244 If the executive power were as vast and allinclusive as unitary theorists suggest, Justice Kagan observes, the
Opinions Clause would be redundant at best and inexplicable at
worst.245 The majority provides no response to this argument. Justice
Kagan also offers historical arguments to show that “executive power”
does not include the power to remove: Parliament restricted the King’s
removals, and many states at the time of the Framing permitted
restrictions on gubernatorial removals.246 In recent scholarly work,
Professor Julian Mortenson has gone further and demonstrated persuasively that in both England and during the Framing and Ratification
period, the phrase “executive power” had no substantive content; it
meant merely the power to execute laws created by some other body.247
The Take Care Clause also provides the Court with little additional
support for its position, as Justice Kagan notes and scholars have argued
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
242
243

Id. at 2197 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2227–28 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“‘[E]xtrapolat[ing]’ an
unrestricted removal power from such ‘general constitutional language’ . . . is ‘more than the text
will bear.’” Id. at 2228 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.29
(1988)).).
244 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
245 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2227 n.3 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246 Id. at 2228; see also Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 323 (2016) (discussing state constitutions); Peter M. Shane, Prosecutors at the
Periphery, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241 (2019) (noting that criminal prosecution was understood to
be quasi-judicial as much as executive at the time of the Founding).
247 See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169 (2019); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power
Clause, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). Mortenson contrasts executive power with the
King’s “prerogative powers,” which were substantive. Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive
Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, supra, at 1228 & n.253. Note also that Chief Justice Roberts
refers to removal as the President’s “prerogative.” Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.
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at great length.248 The Clause is framed as a duty, rather than a power,
and it appears in a section of Article II enumerating duties, not powers.249 To the extent the Take Care Clause is a power, Justice Kagan
observes, it is only the power to ensure that “the laws” (however they
are fashioned) are “executed.”250 In this sense, a removal according to
congressionally specified criteria, such as inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office, is the faithful execution of the laws.251 Nonremoval
except for at the end of a term of years (which every appointee removable for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office had252) is also the
faithful execution of the laws.253 “The President,” as Justice Brandeis
noted in Myers, “performs his full constitutional duty, if, with the means
and instruments provided by Congress and within the limitations prescribed by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful execution
of the laws enacted.”254
Perhaps the most striking feature of Seila’s textual and structural
analysis is that, in his thirty-seven-page majority opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts never once mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Clause is of obvious relevance, as it gives Congress the power “[t]o make
all Laws . . . necessary and proper” to execute not just its Article I
powers, but also “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”255 The Clause even uses the word “vest,” as if to make clear
that Congress can pass laws to organize the executive power that is
“vested” in Article II.256 As Dean John Manning has noted, “the
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress express power to prescribe
the means by which both the executive and judicial powers are carried

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
248 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2228 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II,
132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019) (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes a “restrictive duty”
rather than generating “expansive power,” id. at 2192).
249 U.S. CONST. art. II.
250 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2228 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251 Manners & Menand, supra note 228.
252 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 790 tbl.2 (2013) (showing that all agency heads or administrators with statutory for-cause removal protection have specified tenures).
253 Manners & Menand, supra note 228. Scholars sometimes associated with the unitary executive theory even recognize that Congress thus has a removal power, in the sense that it can pass
laws restricting officers to a term of years and eliminate offices altogether. See Saikrishna Prakash,
Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1780 (2006).
254 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
255 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an extensive treatment, see John Mikhail, The Necessary
and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014).
256 Cf. generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
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into execution.”257 Justice Kagan deftly argues that the Court “appropriate[s]” this power from Congress.258 Another way to put it is that
Seila involves the erasure of explicit, textually granted Article I powers.
Seila also presumes that the President’s removal power is “confirmed
by history and precedent.”259 The Chief Justice says that the so-called
“Decision of 1789” settled the question.260 The best historical evidence,
however, does not support this interpretation. Justice Kagan notes that
“Taft’s historical research [on the Decision] has held up even worse than
Myers’ holding,” and observes that one of the leading scholars of executive power, Professor Sai Prakash, says in his study of the Decision that
the First Congress “never squarely addressed” the removal question at
issue in Seila.261 Professor Jed Shugerman’s review goes even further in
questioning the Court’s reading of the early history.262 Shugerman argues that “Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation is consistent with Taft’s
Madison, but not Madison’s Madison.”263 Among other pieces of evidence, including an extensive analysis of legislative voting patterns,
Shugerman says Chief Justice Roberts ignores that Madison himself recognized the First Congress had not established a default rule in favor of
at-pleasure removal.264
In a set of passages reminiscent of Professor Karl Llewellyn’s famous
account of the canons of construction, Justice Kagan and Chief Justice

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
257 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
2005 (2011); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984) (“The text and structure of the
Constitution impose few limits on Congress’s ability to structure administrative government.”).
258 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2244 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in
original) (quoting John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term — Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78 (2014)).
259 Id. at 2197 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2192 (arguing the power to remove was “settled
by the First Congress”).
260 Id. at 2197 (“The view that ‘prevailed, as most consonant to the text of the Constitution’ and
‘to the requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department,’ was that the executive
power included a power to oversee executive officers through removal.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010))).
261 Id. at 2230 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Saikrishna Prakash,
New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1072 (2006)).
262 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Strategic Ambiguity and the
Imaginary Unitary Executive (Part I), Fordham L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 3596566 (May 8,
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596566 [https://perma.cc/7KQC-VGDJ]; Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Decisions of 1789 Were Non-unitary: Removal by Judiciary and the
Imaginary Unitary Executive (Part II) 35, Fordham L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 3597496 (May
10, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597496 [https://perma.cc/2HRCE2QK] [hereinafter Shugerman, The Decisions of 1789].
263 Shugerman, The Decisions of 1789, supra note 262, at 35.
264 Id.
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Roberts also duel over the Federalist Papers.265 Llewellyn noted that
for every canon there is an equal and opposite canon, such that any
thrust of the rhetorical epee can be parried by a skilled fencer.266 Justice
Kagan offers up dueling views on the removal power — both from the
Federalist Papers — as a way to show that there was no settled meaning
at ratification.267 The Chief Justice’s response is that Madison and
Hamilton changed their minds over time.268 It may be that the Court
means to adopt a “liquidation” theory of interpretation,269 but even then,
the facts on the Decision of 1789 remain, at best, messy, complex, and
inconclusive. Whether or not the Court adopts a liquidation theory, its
account of the historical record raises classic interpretive problems that
Judge Harold Leventhal once described (and that Justice Scalia characterized) as “looking over a crowd and picking your friends.”270 When a
legislative record is conflicting, messy, and complicated, and the enacted
legislative text is unclear, relying on reasoning and inferences from legislative debates, proposals, actions, or inaction can easily turn into
cherry-picking evidence that supports a predetermined policy position.
Justice Kagan forcefully shows that precedent also cuts against the
Court’s position. Although the Chief Justice characterized Myers as a
“landmark” case in both Free Enterprise Fund and Seila,271 Justice
Kagan points out that the Court had all but overturned Myers prior to
these recent cases, in favor of the approach offered in Humphrey’s
Executor and Morrison. Humphrey’s Executor, Justice Kagan notes,
“unceremoniously — and unanimously — confined Myers to its facts”
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
265 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950); see Seila, 140 S. Ct.
at 2229 n.4 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2205 n.10 (majority opinion).
266 Llewellyn, supra note 265, at 401–06.
267 See Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2229 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In
Federalist No. 77, Hamilton presumed that under the new Constitution ‘[t]he consent of [the Senate]
would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint’ officers of the United States.”); id. (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, in which Madison says “[t]he tenure of the ministerial offices generally
will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case, and the example of the
State Constitutions”). She notes too that “[n]either view, of course, at all supports the majority’s
story.” Id.
268 Id. at 2205 n.10 (majority opinion).
269 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Seigel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2017); William Baude, Constitutional
Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (explaining James Madison’s theory of “liquidation” as a
method of looking at post-Founding practice to settle constitutional disputes).
270 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (“It sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as
my late colleague [Judge] Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking your friends.’”).
271 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010); Seila, 140 S. Ct.
at 2192.
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and “expressly ‘disapproved’” everything in the decision as “out of harmony” with Humphrey’s Executor (with the sole exception of the narrow
factual holding regarding postmasters of the first class).272
Justice Kagan also pushed back on the Court’s antinovelty claim.
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a “Rinse and Repeat” clause,
she said.273 “Congress had no obligation to make a carbon copy of a
design from a bygone era.”274 In scholarly work, Professor Leah Litman
has exhaustively shown that antinovelty arguments make little logical
or constitutional sense, in part because there is no constitutional or practical reason for Congress to regulate to its fullest capacity in every possible manner at every possible time.275 But it is also worth noting that
how the Court frames the historical scope of its inquiry shapes whether
an agency’s design looks novel. For example, Seila talks of the Civil
War–era Comptroller, but not the Founding-era Comptroller (as Justice
Kagan points out).276 It discusses the Administrator of Social Security
and the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency,277 but not
the Sinking Fund Commission, a Hamilton-proposed, First
Congress–created economic agency whose members included the Chief
Justice and the Vice President, neither of whom could be removed from
office.278 The Court also offers no explanation for the Second National
Bank, created in 1816 with the assent of then-President James
Madison.279 The President could appoint and remove only one-fifth of
the Bank’s directors.280 The Second Bank, of course, was also upheld
by Chief Justice Marshall as an exercise of the Necessary and Proper
power in McCulloch v. Maryland.281 Framing the scope of historical
practice — and limiting it to single-director heads of agencies with forcause removal protections — is itself a freighted choice. It is unclear
why the Court should adopt this level of specificity when evaluating the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
272 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2233 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935)).
273 Id. at 2241.
274 Id. at 2242.
275 Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1427–28 (2017). For a discussion of innovation-based arguments in the context of recess appointments, see Gillian E. Metzger,
Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607 (2015).
276 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2241 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277 Id. at 2202 (majority opinion).
278 See id. at 2229, 2230–31 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Christine Kexel
Chabot, Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies,
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3458182 [https://perma.cc/6UVW-3MY8].
279 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2231 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280 Id.
281 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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congressional design of agencies, unless its goal is to stack the deck
against novel agency designs.282
All of this should be troubling to most constitutional lawyers. One
of the central arguments for relying on text and history in constitutional
interpretation is judicial restraint.283 Following the text or the original
history, or even historical practice, is supposed to constrain judges and
prevent them from imposing their policy preferences on the country.284
The more a judge is picking friends from the historical crowd, to modify
the old saying, the more likely it is the judge is making policy. Given
the strong arguments against the Court’s position on text, structure,
original history, and historical practice, let alone the un-precedenting of
Humphrey’s Executor and re-precedenting of Myers, it is not clear that
there is much restraint being exercised in Seila.
And it is not as if a restrained approach was unavailable to the conservative majority. In thorough, expansive, and persuasive articles,
Dean John Manning has offered a lesson in how a faithful, conservative,
restrained interpreter of the Constitution’s text should address separation of powers cases.285 “Where the Constitution is specific,” the Court
should follow it.286 Where “no specific clause speaks directly to the
question at issue, interpreters must respect the document’s indeterminacy,”287 which in this context defaults to the textually granted general
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the Court does not
follow Manning’s approach or counter it. Indeed, it is Justice Kagan
who cites Manning and makes the case for judicial restraint in light of
text and history.288
As if to underscore, albeit subtly, that even the Justices understood
that Seila was a deeply political case, the amicus appointed to argue the
CFPB’s case was distinguished conservative lawyer Paul Clement.289
Commentators noted that Justice Kagan likely chose Clement in order
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
282 This selection-effects problem is distinct from the weight that longevity is given. As Metzger
has noted, members of the Court treat that asymmetrically too. Metzger, supra note 64, at 19
(“[N]ovelty can condemn an administrative arrangement, but lack of novelty can’t save it.”).
283 On textualism and restraint, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 1, 24–25, 35 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (discussing textualism in the statutory context). On historical practice, see Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 65–
66 (2017); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 428 (2012) (“Precisely because the Constitution’s textual references to executive power are so spare and because there are relatively few judicial precedents in the area, historical practice may provide the most objective basis for decision.”).
284 See Scalia, supra note 283, at 17–18, 23 (discussing textualism in the statutory context).
285 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 257, at 1947; Manning, supra note 258.
286 Manning, supra note 257, at 1947.
287 Id. at 1948.
288 See Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2227–30 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
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to appeal to the Court’s conservatives and depoliticize the case.290 After
oral argument, however, some commentators suggested this tactic might
have backfired, because of both Clement’s style and his substance.291
Ultimately, the Court’s weak reasoning, Justice Kagan’s efficient
work dismantling it, and the availability of a conservative, textualist
alternative leave a reader wondering if there is something else at issue
in Seila than a simple divide on a technical question of constitutional
interpretation — and something bigger at stake with the rise of the unitary executive theory and its support for a preclusive presidential removal power.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REMOVALS
One of the more striking things about Seila is that its first-order political consequences hardly seem to warrant the conflict over it. It is
certainly possible that liberals and conservatives simply disagree on the
best reading of the legal materials. But it is worth considering whether
the issue in Seila might have broader political underpinnings and consequences. This Part starts by noting the first-order symmetry in Seila
and the broader unitary theory as applied to the removal power. It then
speculates on some ways in which Seila might have a normative, and
ideologically contested, vision of the Constitution undergirding it, and
on the particular ways in which its consequences might have politically
relevant implications for the administrative state. This third story offers
more reasons why Seila is worthy of attention and should be considered
a deeply “political” case.
A. First-Order Symmetry and the Unitary Executive
The result in Seila, as I have noted, does not have obvious firstorder political benefits for conservatives or Republicans. The Trump
Administration already controls the CFPB, so the case does not benefit
the current Administration. If anything, it could harm the current
Administration. The rule in Seila means a new Democratic President
could fire the Republican head of the CFPB and nominate a person of
their choosing. Indeed, after the case was decided, commentators
immediately noted that the decision was a “real gift” to a possible Biden

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
290 Ephrat Livni, An Unlikely Hero Could Save the Government Agency Designed to Protect
Consumers, QUARTZ (Oct. 31, 2019), https://qz.com/1738560/scotus-taps-a-famously-conservativeattorney-to-defend-the-cfpb [https://perma.cc/96RZ-B5RL].
291 Josh Blackman, The CFPB Needed Better Friends, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Mar. 4, 2020, 10:56 AM), https://reason.com/2020/03/04/the-cfpb-needed-better-friends
[https://perma.cc/7AM3-YXYA].

390

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:352

Administration, as he could fire Director Kraninger on day one if he is
elected.292
An even more aggressive unitary executive decision, along the lines
Justice Thomas suggests, would not have made Seila more favorable to
conservatives, in terms of its first-order effects. Seila itself seems to
contemplate future cases marching in this direction. Chief Justice
Roberts described the exceptions to a preclusive presidential removal
power as twofold: “[O]ne for multimember expert agencies that do not
wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”293 Any
multimember commission that currently “wields substantial executive
power” is thus potentially at risk of constitutional challenge to ensure its
members are removable at-will by the President.294
Every member of the Court seems to understand this phrase as inviting further litigation. The majority attempted to reframe the FTC’s
powers in 1935 as limited to “making reports and recommendations to
Congress” and “submitting recommended dispositions to an Article III
court.”295 This characterization creates a contrast between the 1935
FTC (which was upheld because it did not wield substantial executive
power) and the current FTC (which by implication does wield substantial executive power). Justice Kagan fired back that the FTC “could
and did run investigations, bring administrative charges, and conduct
adjudications,” and that it “lacks all plausibility” that the Court in 1935
misunderstood these powers.296 Her point is to show that the FTC in
1935 did wield substantial executive powers, so as to insulate it (and
other agencies) from a future challenge. Meanwhile, Justice Thomas
noted that he joined the majority opinion because the Court limited
Humphrey’s Executor to agencies that do not wield substantial executive
power.297 He even emphasized that clause in italics, perhaps as a flag to
future litigants.298 It’s hard to read these passages as anything less than
the first shots in the battle to extend the removal power to multimember
commissions.
But here’s the thing: if the Court does expand the President’s preclusive removal power to cover multimember commissions for which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
292 Adam Levitin, Seila Law v. CFPB: Winners and Losers, CREDIT SLIPS (June 29, 2020, 1:07
PM),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/06/seila-law-v-cfpb-winners-and-losers.html
[https://perma.cc/GK95-CFJB].
293 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2199–200 (emphasis added).
294 This rationale, of course, builds on Free Enterprise Fund. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency
Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2417 (2011) (arguing that “PCAOB embraces a principle — when an agency has policymaking and enforcement powers, the need for
executive control trumps congressional concern for the agency’s independence in its exercise of
adjudicative functions — that is not inherently confined to second-layer removal provisions”).
295 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
296 Id. at 2339 n.10 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297 Id. at 2211 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298 See id.
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Congress has specified removal criteria, that enterprise is also likely to
have symmetrical first-order political effects. With an expansive removal power, a Democratic President could fire inherited Republican
multimember commissioners and nominate new Republican commissioners — but ones who are more aligned with the President’s views.
Alternatively, a Democratic President could fire Republican commissioners and leave their positions open, so long as quorum requirements
are met to keep the agency functioning. In either case, a Democratic
President could then direct the expansive powers of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal
Communications Commission, among other agencies. A Republican
President could, of course, do the same. But that is the point. The firstorder consequences do not obviously help Republicans or Democrats,
conservatives or progressives. Whether we frame the President as a
“decider” or “overseer” with respect to federal agencies does not have
obvious first-order implications.299
That conservative presidential administrations and their movement
allies have thus embraced the unitary theory is perhaps somewhat surprising, and maybe more so given the history of the presidency. In the
late nineteenth century, the presidency was not at the center of the
American political or constitutional universe. Woodrow Wilson’s classic
1885 book was entitled Congressional Government, not presidential government,300 and Lord Bryce felt obligated to include an entire chapter in
his The American Commonwealth explaining why “great men” are not
elected President.301
The transformation of the presidency happened with the Progressive
Era.
Constitutional scholars tend to recall President Theodore
Roosevelt’s comments that the President was empowered to do virtually
anything not prohibited by the Constitution.302 His approach may have
been on the far end of the constitutional spectrum, but Progressive Era
intellectuals generally pushed to expand the power of the presidency as
part of an attempt to shift policymaking away from the constraints of
courts and Congress.303 They believed that a less constrained President
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
299 See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007). Unitary executive champions, Strauss notes, tend to be
on the “decider” side, and skeptics tend to think the Constitution either does not specify or sets up
an overseer role. See id. at 697 n.3.
300 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1981)
(1885).
301 See JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 73–80 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1888).
302 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510 (1913).
303 Stephen Skowronek, The Unsettled State of Presidential History, in RECAPTURING THE
OVAL OFFICE: NEW HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 15, 17
(Brian Balogh & Bruce Schulman eds., 2015).
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would be more attuned to the needs of democracy. Wilson thus claimed
the President was the “only national voice” in public affairs, and progressives saw Presidents as at once leading public opinion and being
regulated by it.304 This reimagining of the presidency was coupled with
a decades-long refashioning of administrative power from the cronyist,
patronage-focused spoils system of the nineteenth century to a more
expert-oriented enterprise that was decoupled from party machines and
bosses. At the same time, progressives were clear that their aim was not
a resurrection of the royal prerogative.305 “The modern president,”
Professor Stephen Skowronek writes, “would not direct affairs at will;
he would orchestrate the work of the whole according to commonly recognized and externally verifiable standards.”306
Presidential power and administrative capacity thus went hand in
hand, and the two were largely designed to advance the goals of economic regulation. Rooseveltians wanted the federal government to regulate corporations.307 Brandeisians wanted the federal government to
break them up.308 Still others wanted federal-corporate collaboration to
stop “ruinous competition.”309 But in each case, the aim was federal power
to regulate economic activity — and this required both administrative capacity and presidential leadership. A generation later, President Franklin
Roosevelt pursued each of these courses at various times, using the
“bully pulpit” that his distant relative had christened to mobilize support
for a range of regulatory policies.310 More narrowly, it is worth pointing
out that it was Democrat Woodrow Wilson who fired Myers, and Democrat Franklin Roosevelt who fired Humphrey. Progressives and their
Presidents championed presidential and administrative power largely in
order to bring the economically powerful to heel. If history is any guide,
we might even wonder if the unitary executive theory might one day
find favor with future progressive Presidents. But to even point out that
possibility is to recognize first-order political symmetry.
B. Why the Removal Power Is “Political”
Given the prominence of the case and the ferocity of the battles over
it, it seems unlikely that there is nothing deeper, nothing political, at
stake. So what are the possible “political” reasons why conservatives
are so supportive of a preclusive removal power? Or, alternatively, what
“political” features make progressives so fiercely opposed to it?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
304
305
306
307

Id. at 19.
See id. at 18–20.
Id. at 20.
GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 174–75
(2017).
308 Id. at 178–81.
309 Id. at 174–85.
310 Id.

2020]

THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENTS

393

I think there are a number of possible explanations, and they can be
divided into two categories. First are normative views of how the separation of powers should function. At times, the opinion in Seila reveals
normative assumptions about constitutional dynamics and values that
plausibly align with ideological divisions. Second are the consequences
for the administrative state. Commentators often reference the rise of the
removal power as tied to an assault on the administrative state, but it is
not entirely clear what mechanism links the two (as compared, for example, to the nondelegation doctrine, which has an obvious first-order
relationship to the administrative state). These two categories are not mutually exclusive, but separating them out — and separating out some of the
different possibilities within each — helps identify the political stakes.311
1. Normative Views of the Separation of Powers. — By normative
view of the separation of powers, I do not mean the best reading of the
relevant legal materials on any particular provision. I mean that
conservatives and liberals might have different views of what the
Constitution should require, based on functional preferences or normative intuitions. In any given case, legal doctrines and interpretive methods might be deployed to achieve that constitutional vision. In Seila
and the removal cases, at least three normative views of the separation
of powers are identifiable.
First, and following one of Justice Kagan’s comments, is a kind of
Schoolhouse Rock constitutionalism. In her dissent, Justice Kagan needled the majority for adopting an overly simplistic approach to constitutional structure, akin to the cartoon civics video’s explanation of the
federal government.312 Her comments seem only partly in jest. It is
possible that some people could have a normative commitment to such
an approach. One could think the Constitution should adhere to a
simple structure of three branches, totally separated, and that such an approach is net beneficial because it is simpler to administer or easier to explain to the general public. The trouble, of course, is that the Schoolhouse
Rock Constitution is manifestly not our Constitution. Moving toward a
simplified form is plainly a political choice, not a legal one.313

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
311 It is worth noting that nothing about this analysis turns on whether members of the Court
intentionally see themselves as advancing a political cause. They could have views that are “political” even if they do not see them that way. They could adopt interpretations that have “political”
effects even if they are not motivated by those effects. They could also act in line with the conventional wisdom within their intellectual ecosystem, independent of how that wisdom came about or
what its effects are. Part of my point here is that those possibilities do not make a decision or
constitutional rule not “political.”
312 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313 For a discussion opposed to this mode of constitutionalism, see Strauss, supra note 257, at
577–79.
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A second view that emerges from the removal cases might be called
strongman constitutionalism or, for the age of Donald Trump, the fetishization of firing. One of the striking things about Myers, Free
Enterprise Fund, and Seila is their view of management and leadership.
Without the removal power, Chief Justice Roberts said, quoting Myers,
it “would make it impossible for the President . . . to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.”314 The reason is that officials in the executive branch will only “fear” and “obey” the “authority that can remove”
them.315 “[T]he threat of removal” is what enables control.316 As a result,
any other elements that might be considered relevant to the political
control of the bureaucracy — funding, personal relationships, oversight,
political factors — are simply “bureaucratic minutiae.”317
This overarching worldview — which depends on “fear” and
“threat[s]” to get people to “obey” — seems to involve a strongman leader
who controls the bureaucracy from the top down. Other commentators
have called the removal power the “gun behind the door” because it
enables the president to “bend” subordinates “to his will.”318 This approach is perhaps somewhat fitting for the moment, given that the current
occupant of the White House’s most famous phrase is “You’re Fired.”319
It is worth pointing out that there is nothing legal or constitutional
about this approach — including the reasoning behind the removal
power as a way to effectuate political control of the bureaucracy.
Rather, this is a form of what Professors David Pozen and Adam
Samaha have called “anti-modalities” in constitutional law.320 Pozen
and Samaha show that functional arguments often seep into constitutional law, under the cover of accepted modalities of constitutional reasoning or by modification into shallow and superficial platitudes so as
not to appear as “impermissible” policy arguments.321
Indeed, the idea that everything but firing is “bureaucratic minutiae”
and that firing is the only effective means of control would be a surprise
to the entire field of political science, and much of administrative law
too. Members of these fields have spent decades describing various
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
314
315
316
317

Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926)).
Id. at 2197 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
Id. at 2203.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010); Seila, 140 S. Ct.
at 2207 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164).
318 CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 20 (2d ed. 1960).
319 Cf. Marc Fisher, On TV, Trump Loved to Say “You’re Fired.” In Real Life, He Leaves the Dirty
Work to Others., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-tvtrump-loved-to-say-youre-fired-in-real-life-he-leaves-the-dirty-work-to-others/2018/03/14/
0e85d25e-27a7-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html [https://perma.cc/2GDA-6XE3].
320 See David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-modalities, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3579500 [https://
perma.cc/8QXS-CPQU].
321 Id.
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forms of political control over the bureaucracy short of firing. Books
and articles recount the many ways Congress exercises control over
agencies;322 the ways Presidents exercise power over officials short
of threatening to remove them;323 examples of situations in which a
President cannot practically remove subordinates because of their independent power or leverage;324 and indeed, even the ways in which presidential removal might be unnecessary, ineffectual, or actually backfire
and reduce political control of the bureaucracy.325
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
322 See generally, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS
(1999); JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002); DOUGLAS L.
KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS
ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2016); Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional
Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766 (2010); Jack M.
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006); Kenneth Lowande,
Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies, 81 J. POL. 33 (2019); Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). For a more general discussion of issues surrounding agency
accountability and independence, see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 666–99 (1941); Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?,
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015); David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms
of Agency Independence, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487 (2015); Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074–75 (2005).
323 See generally, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Eloise Pasachoff, The
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016); Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599,
644–45 (2010) (discussing jawboning and litigation control); Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates,
Policy Signals and Executive Governance: Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. POL.
995 (2003); Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent
Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273 (1993) (exploring the issue of executive control
over litigation); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991).
324 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1595, 1600 (1997).
325 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 53, 68–69 (2008); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6
(2013) (“Empirical evidence and political science models instead show that the power to remove is
sometimes unnecessary and sometimes ineffectual to the goal of political control of the bureaucracy.
Worse, presidential removal authority often has perverse and undesirable effects quite apart from
democratic accountability goals.”); id. at 39 (“Removal may not only be unnecessary given the extant
instruments of agency control wielded by a supervising official; it may also be ineffectual because
it is too costly, too clumsy, and too molar a tool for attaining desired policy results. As a result of
these limitations, even a supervising official who has no other instruments of agency control will
not necessarily find her ability to elicit desirable policy outcomes increased in any meaningful
way by a judicial intervention reallocating removal power.”); Robert V. Percival, Presidential
Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1003
(2001) (arguing that even with removal, Presidents cannot direct subordinates to take substantive
positions on issues about which they are legally entitled to make decisions). Note also that
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In other words, there are a range of views on how best to control
bureaucracies, including debates over whether presidential control
through removal is the optimal way to do so. The vision of Presidents
governing the bureaucracy through “fear” and “threat[s]” is one approach to management. But it is not the only one. And it is also hard
to believe that the generation that overthrew a king would have endorsed it. For our purposes, however, the point is not that political control of the bureaucracy through fear and threats is the right or wrong
approach. It is that it is fundamentally a choice — and a contested one
— to govern in that way. The Court, as Justice Kagan says, “has nothing
but intuition to back up its essentially functionalist claim that the CFPB
would be less capable of exercising power if it had more than one
Director.”326 It also has nothing but intuition to back up its essentially
functionalist claim that at-will removal is necessary for political control
of the bureaucracy.
A brief sidebar: if members of the Court do take this view of managerial dynamics, it likely implies that they see themselves as completely
unaccountable. Unlike the President, they are not subject to elections,
and any other mechanism of political control over the judiciary would
be, in the Chief Justice’s words, “bureaucratic minutiae.” To the extent
the Justices do feel disciplined by other factors, such as public opinion,
then their intuition about the essential role the threat of firing plays is
inconsistent with their own behavior and experience.
In any case, conservatives might support strongman constitutionalism for functional reasons. They could think it is the most effective (or
only effective) way to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed.
Another possibility is that the roots of strongman constitutionalism are
psychological. In his book The Righteous Mind, Professor Jonathan
Haidt argues that conservatives differ from liberals at the level of deep
psychological intuitions, particularly with respect to their commitment
to hierarchy.327 Political scientists have similarly suggested that divergences of this type can explain a great number of policy differences.328
It is possible that either some psychological impetus, or more weakly,
simply an intuition in favor of hierarchy, is at the source of conservatives’ general preference for the removal power, the unitary executive,
and the system of management that undergirds both. Given that there
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Presidents have other tools at their disposal — for example, an official’s ambition to get their next
job, rather than being fired from the current one. Sitaraman & Dobkin, supra note 66, at 750.
326 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2244 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327 See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2013).
328 MARK J. HETHERINGTON & JONATHAN D. WEILER, AUTHORITARIANISM AND
POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2009); KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN
DYNAMIC (2005).
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is nothing “legal” or “constitutional” about psychological biases, if Seila
is based in part on these intuitions, it should be seen as political.
A third view is of libertarian constitutionalism. Conservatives might
hold a normative position that the Constitution should put a thumb on
the scale against federal power generally and economic regulation
specifically.329 This libertarian vision often seeps into constitutional arguments, with the libertarian anti-modality masquerading as constitutional reasoning. For example, the Supreme Court frequently argues
that the separation of powers exists, in part, to safeguard individual
liberty.330 Seila continues this trend, claiming that “[t]he Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of
power were critical to preserving liberty.”331 This libertarian separation
of powers argument suggests that it is essential to prevent the accumulation of power to preserve freedom from government tyranny, and is
offered in defense of a formalist reading of the structural separation of
powers principle.332 But the argument says nothing about the ability of
government to protect individuals from private tyranny.333 As one
scholar has noted, “it can be just as oppressive to prevent government
from operating as to hijack its operation for factional ends.”334
This concern, at least as much as the libertarian one, motivated the
Framers to create the Constitution. Constitutionalism, as scholars have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
329 For a recent discussion of how this anti-government, anti-administrative approach manifests
in recent constitutional cases, sub-constitutional cases, and academic literature, see Metzger, supra
note 64. I include here both libertarian and classical liberal perspectives, as the two are closely
related. On the more philosophical side, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2013); and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE
CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED
GOVERNMENT (2017). More doctrinal and historical works include Gary Lawson, The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (declaring in its very first sentence
“[t]he post–New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional”) and PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014), to which Professor Adrian Vermeule has responded,
“No,” see Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra).
330 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 546 U.S. 211, 223 (2011) (“[I]ndividuals, too, are protected by
the operations of separation of powers and checks and balances.”); Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,
135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the separation of powers “promotes both liberty and accountability”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 537 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“We
recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual liberty . . . .”);
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497–501 (2010); Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Liberty is always at stake when one
or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.”). Commentators make the
same argument. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1557–58 (1991); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 180, at 1155 (“The genius of the American
Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve individual liberty.”).
331 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2202 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)).
332 Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1033–37
(2014).
333 See Sitaraman & Dobkin, supra note 66, at 735–37.
334 Adrian Vermeule, Reaction, Recess Appointments and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 122, 123–24 (2013).
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long observed, involves both creating capacity for government and controlling government, both building power and constraining it.335 As
Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 51, “[i]n framing a government
. . . the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.”336 Indeed, the entire purpose of the creation of the U.S.
Constitution was to make the national government stronger than the
government under the Articles of Confederation.337
The CFPB offers an excellent illustration. The agency was created
after widespread private discrimination and fraud collapsed the national
and global economies, with devastating consequences for individuals’
lives and livelihoods. The actors who perpetrated those frauds then
fought tooth and nail to prevent regulation of their behavior. The
CFPB, as Justice Kagan pointed out, has recovered more than $11 billion for consumers who were cheated by financial institutions.338
What motivates Seila, however, seems to be the hypothetical possibility of “kneebuckling penalties against private citizens” rather than the
fact that some private citizens took a financial baseball bat to the knees
of other private citizens.339 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s description
of the circumstances around the creation of the CFPB makes no mention
of discrimination, fraud, tricks, traps, deception, or any other illegal,
unfair, or problematic practices. Rather, he characterized the 2008 crisis
as coming (passively) when “the subprime mortgage market collapsed,”
and Warren’s feeling that products were “unsafe” as simply about the
“regulatory jumble.”340
For our purposes, the point is not whether the danger of government
issuing “kneebuckling penalties” is more or less than the danger of private
actors engaging in discrimination and fraud. It is that the “safeguards
of liberty” principle smuggles into separation of powers debates an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
335 See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — Foreword: Looking for Power in
Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 44–46 (2016).
336 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
337 See generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 5 (2003);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2016); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION (2017); Levinson, supra note 335, at 47 (“The overarching ambition of the constitutional Framers was to create a centralized government powerful enough to fulfill the fiscal and
military requirements of respectable statehood.”).
338 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
339 Id. at 2202 n.8 (majority opinion). Judge Pillard made this point nicely in PHH Corp. v.
CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“It remains unexplained why we would assess
the challenged removal restriction with reference to the liberty of financial services providers, and
not more broadly to the liberty of the individuals and families who are their customers.”).
340 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2192. To be sure, Warren was concerned with a regulatory jumble. But
the reason was because it meant that bad practices were not penalized and bad actors in the financial markets were often not held accountable. See Warren, supra note 4.
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assumption that the libertarian concern is stronger than the governmentcapacity concern. This is the Safeguards of Liberty Fallacy341: even if
the principle captures something important at a high level of theoretical
generality, it tells us nothing about how any given case should come out
because it is contravened by the equal and opposite principle of needing
to enable a strong government in order to prevent private tyranny.
Placing a thumb on the scale for the libertarian approach is a contested
political preference.
2. Consequences of Reducing Agency Independence. — Seila might
also be seen as political because there are asymmetric political consequences to creating a presidential removal power — even if they are not
first-order political consequences. Scholars and commentators frequently say that the political stakes in removal cases include the existence and capacity of the administrative state.342 At this high level of
generality, however, it is not clear how exactly that threat manifests.
Progressive Presidents could, of course, use unitary removal powers to
expand the regulatory state. This makes removal different from the
nondelegation doctrine, which has clear first-order consequences for the
administrative state.343 In this section, I consider some of the specific
mechanisms by which the removal power could be asymmetrically “political” with respect to the administrative state — in ways that might
explain the ideological divide.
We might call the first possibility asymmetric bureaucracy. This possibility operates at the level of both agency leadership (commissioners
and agency directors) and civil service bureaucrats. Conservatives
might think that the civil service is largely liberal ideologically and that
agencies with leadership that is insulated from removal might be more
likely to operate in the center-left of the political spectrum. With this
assumption, a presidential removal power could potentially have an
asymmetric effect on the bureaucracy. Firing liberal or moderately conservative agency leaders could make room for more conservative leaders
who can then direct the civil service in line with conservative preferences. And even if they encounter a “deep state” that will not implement
conservative positions, conservative agency leaders would at least have
the power to stop the civil service from taking liberal actions.344
Whether or not distrust of “liberal” civil servants is warranted, a
blanket fear of a liberal bureaucracy does not appear to be. There is
some evidence there are more liberal federal employees than conservative ones, but the differences might not be as great as those who worry
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
341
342
343
344

See Sitaraman & Dobkin, supra note 66, at 735–37.
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 64, at 17–20.
Lawson, supra note 329, at 1237–41.
MIKE LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RISE
OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT (2016).
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about deep state conspiracies think.345 In addition, political scientists
Mark Richardson, Joshua Clinton, and David Lewis have shown that
the bureaucracy is not monolithic in its ideology. Some agencies are
perceived to slant conservative, while others are perceived to be liberal.346 And it is not clear that agencies with removal protections are
systematically more liberal than agencies under the eye of the President.
The Defense Department comes close to maxing out the RichardsonClinton-Lewis scale on the conservative side, while the Department of
Health and Human Services is the mirror image on the liberal side.347
Neither has congressionally specified removal criteria for its leadership.
The SEC and CFTC, commissions with independence from presidential
removal, are perceived to lean conservative; the CFPB and the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, liberal.348 Within agencies,
there is also variation, with some offices considered more conservative
than others.349
The choices between a single-director agency and a multimember
commission and between removal protections or their absence are also
often conflated.350 Separating the two does not help much, at least logically, in identifying a systematic skew either. An EPA that oscillates
between conservatives and liberals does not seem so different than the
Cordray-Mulvaney divide at the CFPB. Indeed, some might contend
that a CFPB that oscillates between conservatives and progressives will,
on net, be more progressive than an SEC that is relatively conservative
regardless of the partisan composition of the Commission.351 The need
for multiple votes, asymmetric partisan polarization (among commissioners), the Democratic coalition’s balance between progressives and
centrists, and a host of other factors arguably combine to ensure that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
345 Federal employees, for example, gave more money to Hillary Clinton than to Donald Trump
in 2016. Jonathan Swan, Government Workers Shun Trump, Give Big Money to Clinton, THE HILL
(Oct. 26, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/302817-government-workersshun-trump-give-big-money-to-clinton-campaign [https://perma.cc/74XX-8G9U]. But at the same
time, at an earlier point in that same election cycle, polling showed forty percent of federal employees identifying as Republican or Republican-leaning, compared to forty-four percent as Democratic
or Democratic-leaning. Eric Katz, There Are More Republicans in Federal Government than You
Might Think, GOV. EXEC. (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2015/08/there-aremore-republicans-federal-government-you-might-think/119138 [https://perma.cc/Q632-TZJ5]. An
earlier, 2014 survey of federal executives found that forty-four percent identified as liberal, thirtyfive percent as moderate, and twenty-one percent as conservative. See David E. Lewis, Opinion, “Deep
State” Claims and Professional Government, REG. REV. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/
2017/12/05/lewis-deep-state-professional-government [https://perma.cc/6ELU-NUBM].
346 Mark D. Richardson, Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Elite Perceptions of Agency
Ideology and Workforce Skill, 80 J. POL. 303, 307 fig. 3, app. at 11–16 (2018); Lewis, supra note 345.
347 Lewis, supra note 345.
348 Richardson et al., supra note 346, at 307.
349 Id. at 305.
350 Sitaraman & Dobkin, supra note 66, at 722–23.
351 Id. at 731.
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multimember commissions will not be terribly progressive, even though
commissioners are not removable at will.352
It is also not clear that a civil servant in an agency whose leadership
is removable will exert more independent power over policy than will
their counterpart in an agency whose leadership is not removable. It
might instead be that civil servants in both cases take direction faithfully
from the agency leadership — or that civil servants in both cases disobey
guidance from agency leadership.353 Similarly, accounts of removable political appointees taking aggressive actions that even push civil servants to
the point of resignation do not seem so far from Director Mulvaney’s
aggressive actions as the nonremovable head of the CFPB.354 And of
course, civil service disobedience can take place in both Republican and
Democratic administrations.355 In any case, political scientists have
found that civil servants report that their senior ranks are responsive or
very responsive to the policy decisions of the President.356 In a
Democratic administration, liberal agencies are more responsive than
conservative agencies, and the opposite is likely true as well.357
Still, regardless of accuracy or precision, it remains possible that the
politics of the removal power are based on some general impression that
the administrative state is liberal — and an assumption that presidential
removal can rein in a liberal bureaucracy.
A second possibility is asymmetric presidential administration. It
might be that conservatives think that Democrats and Republicans are
asymmetrically polarized not just in their political views,358 their willingness to fill judicial positions,359 or their willingness to play political

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
352 See generally id. Indeed, in other work, I have called for making the FTC into a singledirector agency for these reasons. See GANESH SITARAMAN, TAKING ANTITRUST AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 11, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE (Sept. 2018), https://
greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Taking-Antitrust-Away-from-theCourts-Report-092018-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHX3-GBZ9].
353 See Jennifer Nou, Civil Service Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 357 (2019). For
an argument that civil servants, political leadership, and outside groups create a new separation of
powers, see Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515 (2015).
354 Compare supra pp. 356–57, with Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability in the Deep State, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 1532, 1535–36 (2018) (describing the complaints and resignation of a civil servant at the
Department of the Interior).
355 Nou, supra note 353, at 351.
356 Lewis, supra note 345.
357 Id.
358 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11 (2005).
359 See David Fontana, Cooperative Judicial Nominations During the Obama Administration,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 305, 306.
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and constitutional hardball360 — but also their willingness to have the
President wield the powers of the administrative state. Democrats
might be systematically unwilling to appoint officials who are progressive and to use the administrative state aggressively for regulatory ends.
Republicans might be systematically willing to appoint extreme conservatives and to use the administrative state aggressively for deregulatory ends. In that case, the removal authority would mean a net benefit
over time for conservatives.
The history of the Reagan Justice Department’s actions suggests an
understanding of the possibilities of using legal authorities and arguments aggressively to change the terms of policy and politics.361 So long
as conservatives were ahead of the curve in recognizing and using those
tactics, the removal power and the broader unitary theory would have
asymmetric effects. Some might argue that progressives also use presidential power aggressively, potentially making this explanation less valuable.362 But even with President Clinton’s use of presidential administration363 and President Obama’s often creative regulatory
endeavors,364 it may be that presidential administration is asymmetrically polarized. The Trump Administration’s approach to the CFPB,
for example, has been far more radically deregulatory than the CFPB
was regulatory in its early years.
More broadly, given the historical relationship between progressives
and the presidency, the recent example of President Obama’s use of executive authorities, and the challenges of retaining unified government,
one might think Democrats might even come to embrace the unitary
theory as a way to accomplish their policy goals. There are a variety of
practical and political reasons why an asymmetry in views of the unitary
theory is likely to persist — including Democrats’ tendency to a technocratic form of governance, the heterogeneity of the Democratic political
coalition, industry capture and the divide between left-neoliberals and
progressives, and fears that playing hardball will backfire — but it is
also worth noting a set of intellectual commitments within the left that
make ideological drift along these lines unlikely.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
360 Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
915, 918 (2018); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 524–29
(2004).
361 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 199.
362 Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama Has
Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/us/
politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/L3L4-L3Y8]; Nick Gass, Christie:
Obama Wants to Act “As if He Is a Dictator,” POLITICO (Jan. 3, 2016, 12:52 PM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2016/01/christie-obama-guns-executive-actions-217297 [https://perma.cc/8P369SMZ].
363 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001).
364 David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267–
68 (2013).
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Democrats might potentially be willing to support a unitary theory
when it comes to the regulatory state but not the national security state.
Civil libertarian fears with respect to war and criminal justice push
against building state capacity, even though state capacity is also needed
to combat economic power and address economic injustice. General
theories of state power thus run up against these policy preferences.
Indeed, Democrats tend to be internally divided between liberals, who
are more concerned with individual rights, and progressives, who are
more concerned with building structures of power.365 This divide might
make progressives more willing to build executive power than liberals,
even with the attendant risks, but the fractured coalition may make
adopting the theory more difficult.
Interestingly, liberals and progressives could develop a structural
constitutional or political theory that might account for these challenges.
Constitutional theorists speak frequently of foreign affairs or national
security exceptionalism, with those realms warranting greater executive
power and judicial deference than domestic affairs.366 But one could
imagine progressives developing a theory of national security exceptionalism that cuts in the opposite direction. Given the particular dangers
of state power over life itself and a range of hawkish biases that affect
individual and group decisionmaking,367 controls on state power should
arguably be more stringent in these sectors, not less, than in the economic realm — or at least equally stringent.368 A theory along these
lines would parallel the divide between economic regulation and personal rights that emerged through the New Deal settlement, but at the
level of structure rather than rights.369
A third, and closely related, possibility might be thought of as what
Steve Bannon called the “deconstruction of the administrative state.”370
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
365 On the liberal legacy, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 145 (1996).
366 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1897, 1906–11 (2015) (discussing foreign affairs exceptionalism).
367 Ganesh Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 521
(2015).
368 As a constitutional theory, this would of course be subject to specific textual provisions. As a
matter of policy, divides between foreign and domestic could be justified based on specific
functional needs, rather than over- and underinclusive categories like foreign and domestic. See
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 366, at 1935–49; see also Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look
Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 525–32 (2014).
369 Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1457–58 (2015) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014)).
370 Philip Rucker, “Deconstruction of the Administrative State” Is the Plan, Bannon Tells
Conservatives, MCCLATCHY DC: IMPACT 2020 (Feb. 23, 2017, 9:50 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/
news/politics-government/article134553909.html [https://perma.cc/34KV-DYD9]. Professor David Noll
has recently characterized deliberate efforts to undermine agencies as a form of sabotage, rather than
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Progessive-era reformers saw the administrative state as “the only institution capable of securing a competitive economy and fair society,” and
their opponents thus saw it as “an intrinsic threat to personal freedom
and private ordering.”371 Conservatives might therefore want to undermine it. There are two linked, asymmetric mechanisms at work. The
first is the asymmetry in building and breaking. In his book Political
Order and Political Decay, Professor Francis Fukuyama argues that institutions can suffer from political decay if they fail to reform and update
to changed conditions.372 He notes that dysfunction and entrenched actors in the United States contribute to this decay.373 But active efforts
to break institutional capacity do as well. As he describes in great detail,
building institutional capacity and reforming institutions is difficult
work.374 If it is easier to break an institution than it is to build it, easier
to erode capacity than to generate it, then greater presidential control
might have asymmetric effects that benefit those who want to break
institutional capacity more than those who want to strengthen it.
Expansive presidential power is particularly important for this project
if proponents cannot get the votes or political support to pass legislation
eliminating agencies altogether.
The “deconstruction of the administrative state” might not simply
mean a desire to deregulate or reduce the capacity of the regulatory
state. It is possible that the aim is to delegitimize the administrative
state altogether.375 Here, the removal power could have asymmetric effects through the mechanism of making the federal government more
partisan and more responsive to presidential preferences. While removal is not the only and perhaps not even the most important element
of agency independence, it is clear, concrete, and perhaps symbolically
important. Members of agencies who hold norms and follow practices
of independence might see their own roles differently if the agency head
is formally removable at will — precisely because that power is attached
to the unitary theory.376 In addition, if the public increasingly sees “expert” agencies as little more than arms of partisans, subject to the whims
of the President and staffed with the President’s cronies, then the entire
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
mere policy disagreement. See David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
371 Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1967 (2018).
372 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 462 (2014).
373 Id. at 503–04.
374 This is the subject of both volumes of his work on the topic. See id.; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (2011).
375 For a discussion related to the use of antigovernment rhetoric, see Metzger, supra note 64, at
50 (“[T]he Court’s rhetorical invocations of liberty-threatening bureaucrats . . . undermine[] the
administrative state’s sociological and moral legitimacy . . . .”).
376 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1204
(2013) (discussing the SEC’s independence as an unwritten convention).
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expertise-based administrative enterprise might increasingly appear illegitimate. This could be based on an opposition to expertise in itself377
or to governance by semiautonomous experts.378
Delegitimizing the expert-based administrative state would have
multiple consequences. It would undermine the existing administrative
state’s operations and also reduce the likelihood of future innovations
and the development of administrative capacity to address new problems that emerge.379 Importantly, reducing the legitimacy of the administrative state could also have a spiraling effect, by which, as Fukuyama
has explained, “[d]istrust of executive agencies leads [to] demands for
more legal checks on administration, which further reduces the quality
and effectiveness of government by reducing bureaucratic autonomy.”380
The consequence would be a vicious cycle that keeps eroding bureaucratic institutions and public confidence in them.
The fourth and final explanation rests on constitutional political
economy.381 The policy fights over the CFPB — and the PCAOB —
were fiercely contested because they were fundamentally about the regulation of economically powerful actors. Most commentators in recent
years have focused on the First Amendment as the constitutional
weapon of choice in facilitating a deregulatory policy agenda.382 Another
tactic is narrowing the scope of the Commerce Clause, an approach that
has enjoyed an occasional revival in both the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts.383 The First Amendment operates as an external limit on congressional power; the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence acts as an
internal limit.384
Seila and Free Enterprise Fund might be seen as another front in
the war over constitutional political economy, with the site of the battle
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
377 See generally TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE (2017) (describing the rise of
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being the Necessary and Proper Clause.385 The cases, and the unitary
theory itself, are framed around giving content to unspecified Article II
powers. The constant reference to “all” executive power broadens the
scope of that unspecified power, while individual cases help articulate
its content. But unitary theory conservatives never seem to reference
“all” of Congress’s Necessary and Proper power. As we have seen, the
Seila majority does not mention the clause at all. The unitary executive
theory’s expansion of preclusive Article II powers may therefore be as
much about shrinking Congress’s textually granted and extremely broad
Article I Necessary and Proper power. Seila could thus be read in conjunction with the creation of the recognition power in Zivotofsky II;386
with the Court’s recent opinions shrinking the Necessary and Proper
Clause, like NFIB v. Sebelius;387 and with its broader First Amendment
and Commerce Clause jurisprudence constraining Congress’s power to
regulate.388
If Seila, the removal power, and the modern rise of the unitary executive theory are indeed part of a broader battle to reduce the power of
Congress, the political context of the mid-twentieth century was likely
an important contributing factor. From 1933 until 1995 — a total of
sixty-two years — Democrats held the House of Representatives for
fifty-eight years.389 During those same sixty-two years, Democrats held
the Senate for fifty-two.390 But partisan control over the presidency was
far more evenly divided — twenty-eight years for Republicans and
thirty-four years for Democrats. The result is that for decades a
Democratic Congress passed legislation and created agencies with economic and general welfare missions that differed from conservative
preferences. Conservatives might have noticed that increasing presidential powers and reducing congressional power would be to their benefit
because they were more likely to take control of the presidency than
Congress. When the unitary executive theory and the modern drive for
a removal power emerged in the 1980s, Republicans had held power in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
385 For additional discussions of the general contest over constitutional political economy, see
generally, for example, GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION (2017); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014); Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the
Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323 (2019); and Ganesh Sitaraman, America’s Post-crash
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387 567 U.S. 519, 560 (2012).
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Congress for only four years in almost a half-century — and the last
time had been more than twenty-five years earlier.
At a structural level, reducing the scope of Article I powers to regulate does have asymmetrical political consequences even beyond which
party controls Congress.391 It systematically restrains Congress’s ability
to develop creative, innovative solutions to regulate challenging, novel,
contested policy issues — from political corruption and cronyism to interest group capture and economic power. Indeed, the CFPB was deliberately designed in order to insulate the agency from capture by financial institutions — directly and indirectly via a captured Congress
or captured President.392 Holding Congress to only the agency designs
it adopted centuries ago (and taking a blinkered view of those designs
too) will have significant consequences — and those consequences align
with ideological divides between conservatives and progressives on political economy.
Each of these four possibilities is speculative, of course, and particularly as to motivations. But they are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that with decades of Democratic control of Congress and power
over the legislative agenda, conservatives believed that Congress passed
laws that regulated the economically powerful too aggressively and
created agencies to implement those laws that were staffed by liberal
personnel. Unable to eliminate these agencies altogether through the
legislative process, strong Republican Presidents could aggressively
exercise the powers of appointment and administrative oversight to
break down these agencies. Democratic Presidents would have a harder
time building them back up, for both political and institutional reasons.
Premeditated or not, the result of these interlocking asymmetries would
be to undo the New Deal–era administrative state and its system of political economy.
CONCLUSION
“When should courts be responsible for designing federal administrative agencies?” Professor Aziz Huq has asked.393 The obvious answer,
one might think, is never. But between Free Enterprise Fund and Seila,
the Supreme Court has now inserted itself into fiercely contested political battles twice in a decade, and without terribly persuasive textual,
structural, or historical reasoning. The Court might not want to say so,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
391 For discussions of the Rehnquist Court’s “constitutional revolution” that emphasize restrictions on congressional power, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); and Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and
the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78
IND. L.J. 363 (2003).
392 See generally, e.g., Barkow, supra note 32 (identifying some of the ways in which agencies can
be insulated from capture).
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408

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:352

but “personnel is policy,” whether in the specific choices of individuals
or in structuring their offices.
My aim in this Comment has been to show that Seila is a political
case in more ways than one. The CFPB emerged and persisted in spite
of a relentless assault on its existence. That battle took it to the Supreme
Court, where it met an impressive decades-long effort to articulate and
legitimize the unitary executive theory and a preclusive removal power.
Those legal theories, in turn, might depend on normative views of the
Constitution, and they likely have asymmetric political effects — though
not the first-order effects that characterize many “political” issues that
make it to the Supreme Court. Debates over constitutional structure
might seem esoteric, with discussions of obscure historical events and
attempts to divine meaning from a text that is at once concise and general. But that does not necessarily make them any less political than
cases that normally carry that moniker.

